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ABSTRACT
This article examines the regulation of the air transport sector
from the perspective of competition law, focusing specifically on
European Union (EU)-U.S. air transport relations. Emphasis is
placed on the ongoing negotiations between Europe and the
United States for the creation of a transatlantic open aviation
area, where U.S. and European airlines will operate freely without restrictions on traffic rights, subject solely to common rules
agreed upon by the parties. In 2007, the first-ever EU-U.S. Air
Transport Agreement (ATA) was reached, followed in 2010 by a
second-stage agreement. All efforts are now concentrated on
the conclusion of the final agreement. Given that the transatlantic air transport market accounts for almost sixty percent of
world traffic, the conclusion of the final agreement will signal
the creation of the biggest liberalized airspace in the world.
The prospects and challenges thereof are expected to be major
and are examined from the perspective of the consumers, the
airline industry, and the law itself. The first part of the article is
a flight into the past, tracing the regulation of air transport from
the birth of civil aviation up until today. The second part is a
flight into the future, aspiring to foresee how smooth or turbulent the transition to the new regime is going to be. Given that
the successful application of the final agreement is dependent
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upon effective regulatory cooperation aimed ultimately at regulatory convergence, the analysis looks into the prospects and
challenges associated with regulatory convergence at both sector-specific and general competition law levels.
I.

INTRODUCTION
ONCEPTUALIZING AN OPEN aviation area between the
United States and the EU is as demanding an exercise as
comprehending the unknown. If one considers that the sector
of air transport has been regulated ever since its inception on
the basis of bilateral agreements between sovereign states,1 the
idea of an open aviation area where air carriers from a multitude of states operate freely on the basis of common rules is
certainly innovative. Although it is true that the creation of a
single market in Europe and, in particular, a single air transport
market in the 1990s paved the way in this direction, the expansion of this model towards the other side of the Atlantic is undoubtedly a revolutionary idea.
The conclusion in 2007 of the first-ever EU-U.S. ATA opened
up a new chapter in EU-U.S. aviation relations, but also in aviation regulation in general. From a fragmented framework,
whereby each member state of the EU individually negotiated a
bilateral Air Services Agreement (ASA) with the United States, a
transition occurred to a uniform system of a multilateral nature,
whereby a single ASA negotiated directly between the EU and
the United States phased out all bilaterals. Obviously, the materialization of what a few years ago was still unthinkable was, and
continues to be, met with significant difficulties. This is why the
parties agreed from the outset to a staged approach whereby a
couple of preliminary agreements would smooth the way to a
final agreement. Since the preliminary agreements reached in
2007 and 2010 are producing their effects, all efforts are now
concentrated on the conclusion of the final agreement.
This article aims to clarify the reasons why the old system of
bilateral ASAs is no longer sustainable and to look into the
newly emerging system from the perspective of competition law.
To achieve this, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first
part is a flight into the past, tracing the regulation of air transport from the birth of civil aviation to today. The second part is
a flight into the future, aspiring to foresee how the industry will

C

Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Evolution of Air Transport Agreements, 33
AIR & SPACE L.

127, 132 (2008).
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be transformed should a final EU-U.S. ATA come into force.
Both parts are indispensable for the analysis and have equal importance, as planning the future presupposes a clear understanding of the past.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL FLASHBACK-THE REGULATION OF
THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR FROM THE BIRTH
OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
TO TODAY
THE BIRTH OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: FROM THE
PARIS CONVENTION OF 1919 TO THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION OF

1944

The regulation of civil aviation has been determined to a
great extent by the realization of its military potential, as experienced in World War I and World War II. The bombardments
of World War I expedited efforts to regulate international aviation. The Paris Convention of 19192 constituted the first codification of public international air law. Article 1 thereof provided
that each state would enjoy "complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory."3 The incorporation of the
cuius est solum principle into the first article of the Paris Convention was a reflection of the strong security considerations prevailing in the aftermath of a devastating World War.4 More
importantly, the legitimization and encouragement of national
regulation of air transport matters, a corollary of the principle
of national sovereignty, provides a first indication of the regulatory course the aviation industry would follow in the years to

come.
If the extension of the battlefields in the air experienced in
World War I rendered clear the military potential of aviation,
the years following the war highlighted its civilian dimension.
Large numbers of military aircraft "were available for conversion

to civilian use," opening up new prospects for expeditious transport and communications.5 Advances in technology rendered

2 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173.
3 Id. art. 1.
4 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 131.
5 Id. at 129 n.5.
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possible the first intercontinental operations, inducing the creation of air carriers on both sides of the Atlantic.6
The outbreak of World War II obliged the aviation forces of
that era to concentrate on the production of military aircraft,
while using their commercial fleet for military purposes.' In
stark contrast to the European civil aviation industry, which by
the end of the war had almost been destroyed, its U.S. counterpart went through tremendous growth during the war years.8
With a fleet of 20,000 aircraft accounting for seventy-two percent of world air commerce, 9 the United States was the unrivaled aviation power of the day. Against this backdrop, the need
for a comprehensive regulatory framework for post-war international civil aviation led to the International Civil Aviation Conference (Conference), held in Chicago from November 1 to
December 7, 1944 (when the hostilities had not yet ceased).'l
Despite the need for a multilateral exchange of traffic rights,
which would have facilitated commercial air transport operations, strong national security and defense considerations prevailing during the war dictated a prudent approach towards the
regulation of international civil aviation. The Chicago Convention executed at the conclusion of the Conference did not depart in this respect from the principle of exclusive national
sovereignty embedded in the Paris Convention." In a similar
fashion, it proclaimed that "every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. "12 Thus,
although Article 5 of the Convention allows for a limited multilateral exchange of traffic rights for nonscheduled international
flights, no similar provision is made as far as scheduled flights
are concerned. 13 Instead, Article 6 reads "[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of
6 In Europe, national governments and, in particular, the colonial powers of
the day concentrated their resources on the creation of national flag carriers,
entrusted, inter alia,with the mission of linking their overseas acquisitions to their
respective homelands. Id. at 134. The United States, on the contrary, experienced a proliferation of private airlines, in their majority dependent, nevertheless, upon government subsidies for their survival. See id.
7 Id. at 135.
8 Id. at 135-36.
9 Id. at 137.
10 Id. at 135-36.
11 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, opened for signatureDec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
12 Id.
13 Id. art. 5.
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a contracting State, except with the special permission or authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of
such permission or authorization."' 4 In addition, while the freedom to provide cabotage services1 5 was not prohibited, save for
on an exclusive basis, 6 the right1 7to refuse such freedom was
vested with the contracting states.
Article 1 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 6, in
essence prevented any multilateral exchange of traffic rights on
the basis of universally accepted terms and conditions. Instead,
they paved the way for bilateral solutions on the basis of government-to-government negotiations. The reason for the failure of
the Conference to address the growing needs of international
civil aviation by means of multilateral regulation is obviously related to the balance of power between the two leading aviation
forces of that time (the United States on the one hand and the
United Kingdom on the other). The United States, enjoying an
unrivaled superiority in aircraft capacity and technological expertise gained during the war,"' was interested in safeguarding
access to foreign states through the privilege of friendly passage.
It therefore advocated a system of commercial freedom of airlines. 9 The United Kingdom, on the other hand, whose aviation industry had been severely harmed during the war, yet
which was still a colonial power controlling strategic points
around the globe, fearful of unrestrained competition from the
United States, was anxious to preserve its historical rights while
rebuilding its economy and aviation industry.2" It therefore
aimed at a protectionist system 2 along the lines of an International Regulatory Air Authority. '
The policy disagreement between the United States and the
United Kingdom resulted in the Chicago Convention regulating
Id. art. 6.
Cabotage refers to the freedom to provide domestic services, i.e., services
originating in and destined for the same country. See id. art. 7.
16 Article 7, second sentence, reads: "Each contracting State undertakes not to
enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an
exclusive basis,... and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other
State." Id.
17 Article 7, first sentence, reads: "Each contracting State shall have the right to
refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined
for another point within its territory." Id.
18 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 136.
19 Id. at 136-38.
20 Id. at 136-37, 142.
21 Id. at 142.
14
15
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only technical and operational aspects of civil aviation rather
than economic and commercial aspects, the latter being left to
22
sovereign states to decide on the basis of bilateral negotiations.
The freedoms of the sky defined up until that moment related
to:
+ the right of a nation's airlines to fly over the territory of
another country in order to reach a third (first freedom);
+ the right of a nation's airlines to make technical stops for
fuel and maintenance, but not to load or unload passengers or cargo, in another nation while in transit to a third
nation (second freedom);
+ the right to carry commercial traffic (i.e., cargo and passengers) from the operator's state of origin to a third nation
(third freedom);
+ the right to carry commercial traffic from a third nation to
the operator's state of origin (fourth freedom); and,
+ the right to carry commercial traffic between two foreign
nations as an extension of a service originating in or destined for the operator's home state (fifth freedom or "beyond right").23

The first two technical freedoms were exchanged multilaterally by means of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (LASTA),24 which also came out of the Chicago
Conference and has been ratified by over 100 states. The International Air Transport Agreement, also produced at the Conference, provided for a multilateral exchange of international air
services of all five freedoms of the air.25 Yet, its ratification by a
mere eleven states, and certainly not by the United States, 26 despite the latter's campaign for liberalism and openness, did little
to change the compromise solution promoted at the ConferSee Chicago Convention, supra note 11, arts. 77-79; Dempsey, supra note 1,
at 144-45.
23 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement art. I, § 1, Dec. 7, 1944,
59 Stat. 1963 [hereinafter LASTA]; Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Manual on the
Regulation of InternationalAir Transport, at 4.1-8, ICAO Doc. 9626 (1st ed. 1996)
[hereinafter IA T Manual].
24 LASTA, supra note 23.
25 1944 International Air Transport Agreement art. I, § 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1701 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1945) [hereinafter Transport Agreement].
26 InternationalAir Transport Agreement Signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944,
ICAO, http://www2.icao.int/en/leb/List%20of%2OParties/TransportEN.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
22
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ence-that of bilateral regulation of international air transport
matters.27
Although the very limited multilateral exchange of overflight
rights and rights to technical stops left very little room for the
formation of a uniform system of air transport rules applied indiscriminately to all industry participants, the growth dynamic of
civil aviation, already evident during the war years, necessitated
the creation of a global forum for civil aviation. This role was
reserved for the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), established by Article 43 of the Chicago Convention,
whose aims and objectives would be "to develop the principles
and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the
' 28
planning and development of international air transport.
The carefully crafted wording of the relevant Convention provision delineating ICAO's objectives is a reflection of the will of
the signatories not to delegate any regulatory power in the economic field. This resulted in ICAO being established mainly as
a technical standard-setting body, although it cannot be excluded that current developments in the field of economic regulation might induce more active ICAO participation and
involvement in the near future.29
B.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION: FROM BERMUDA I TO FIRST GENERATION
OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS

1. Bermuda I
Upon the conclusion of the Chicago Conference, the United
States engaged in bilateral negotiations with a number of coun27

The freedoms of the sky that have since developed include: the right to

carry commercial traffic between two foreign nations via the operator's state of
registry (i.e., the right of a carrier to fly from a foreign country to its home country, pick up passengers and then carry them on to another foreign country)
(sixth freedom); the right to carry commercial traffic outside the operator's territory (i.e., the right to carry traffic between two foreign nations independent of
any service originating in or destined for the carrier's home nation) (seventh

freedom); the right to carry traffic from one point in the territory of a foreign
country to another point in the same country on a flight which originates in the
airline's home country (eighth freedom or consecutive cabotage); the right to
carry traffic from one point in the territory of a foreign country to another point
in the same country (ninth freedom or pure cabotage). IATManual, supra note
23, at 4.1-9 to 4.1-10.
28 Chicago Convention, supra note 11, arts. 43-44.
29 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Role of the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the Twenty First Century, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 529, 535 (2009).
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tries in an effort to safeguard critical traffic rights for its carriers. 30 These early bilaterals were modeled on the so-called Form
of Standard Agreement for Provisional Air Routes, a model bilateral agreement produced at the Chicago Conference. Nevertheless, the negotiations with the United Kingdom held in
Bermuda from January 15 to February 11, 1946,31 culminated in
a different bilateral agreement from the ones the United States
had concluded up to that point. Bermuda 1,32 also characterized as the "Magna Carta of international aviation,"3 3 defined
the identity of civil aviation for decades, constituting the prototype for future bilateral agreements. 4
A product of compromise between American liberalism and
British protectionism, the agreement dealt with the issues typically addressed by a bilateral agreement (i.e., market entry (designation of airlines and routes) and traffic rights, capacity and
frequency of service, and rate-setting) in a moderately restrictive
way. 5 Thus, while the designation of carriers was left with individual governments, the routes to be operated were to be negotiated bilaterally. Moreover, although the determination of
capacity and frequency levels fell in the first instance within the
discretion of the airlines, such determination had to respect
traffic demand, subject to ex post facto review by individual governments. 6 Lastly, while the setting of fares was delegated to
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), its authority
3 7
was curtailed by the so-called double-approval requirement.
Yet, the most salient feature of the agreement was still another
one. For the first time in a bilateral ASA, the parties reserved
the right to not allow the exercise of traffic rights by carriers in
cases where they were "not satisfied that substantial ownership
30 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 145. Interestingly, the first bilateral agreement in
the history of civil aviation was concluded in 1913 between Germany and France,
which agreed to allow, under conditions, each other's aircraft into their airspace
until a multilateral air convention was adopted. Id. at 132.
31 Id. at 145.
32 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I].
33 Harriet Oswalt Hill, Comment, Bermuda II: The British Revolution of 1976, 44J.
AIR L. & COM. 111, 112 (1978).
34 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 146.
35 See id. at 145-46.
36 Id. at 146.
37 See id. at 145-46.
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and effective control of such carriers are vested in nationals of
either Contracting [State]."38

2.

Ownership and Control Clauses (O&C)

The genesis of the ownership and control requirement must
be sought in the IASTA and the Transport Agreement, which
both provide that "[e]ach contracting State reserves the right to
withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air transport
enterprise of another State in any case where it is not satisfied
that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State."39 It should be noted that the said
agreements are multilateral in nature,4" which means in practice
that the term "contracting state" refers to a multitude of statesin fact, to all parties to the agreement. In contrast, the reference to "either Contracting [State]" in Bermuda I was aimed at
the United States and the United Kingdom exclusively, Bermuda I being a bilateral agreement.4 What is common in both
cases is the discretion of the parties to block the designation of
an airline ("[e]ach Contracting [State] reserves the right")
42
rather than any kind of obligation to do so.

What is meant by the term "substantial ownership and effective control" is an interesting issue, especially as no definition is
provided by either JASTA or the Transport Agreement.43 Generally, "substantial ownership" of an airline is understood as majority ownership, meaning ownership of more than fifty percent
of an airline's voting shares.44 For instance, the so-called 1992
Licensing Regulation, which formed part of the third European
Community (EC or Community) air liberalization package, provided that "the undertaking shall be owned and continue to be
owned directly or through majority ownership by Member States
3s
39

Bermuda I, sup-a note 32, art. 6.
IASTA, supra note 23, art. I, § 5; Transport Agreement, supra note 25, art. I,

§ 6.
40

See IASTA, supra note 23, art. III; Transport Agreement, supra note 25, art.

VIII.
Bermuda I, supra note 32, art. 6.
Id.; see also IASTA, supranote 23, art. I, § 5; Transport Agreement, supranote
25, art. I, § 6.
43 See [ASTA, supra note 23, art. I, § 5; Transport Agreement, supra note 25, art.
I, § 6.
44 Commission Decision 95/404, of 19 July 1995 on a Procedure Relating to
the Application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 (Swissair/Sabena), art.
10, 1995 OJ. (L 239) 19, 24 (EC).
41

42
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and/or nationals or Member States."4 5 This regulation has now
been recast and consolidated in EC Regulation No. 1008/2008,
which simply provides that "Member States and/or nationals of
Member States [shall] own more than fifty percent of the
undertaking.

46

The U.S. perception of the term "substantial ownership" has
fluctuated since its first expression in the Air Commerce Act of
192647 between different percentages of ownership of voting interest, ranging from fifty-one percent to seventy-five percent.
Thus, the initial fifty-one percent threshold set by the 1926 Air
Commerce Act4 8 was later amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, which required an American ownership of seventy-five
percent of an airline's equity.4 9 The Federal Aviation Act of
1958, which was in essence the first piece of legislation promulgated by Congress following the Chicago Convention, maintained the seventy-five percent cap.50 Although the latter
threshold is still valid, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) has shown a willingness to ease this restriction either on
the basis of reciprocity or where American interests are notjeopardized by a higher percentage of foreign ownership. 5 ' This is
so when an increase in foreign equity stake does not exceed
forty-nine percent and, most importantly, does not entail an increase in voting equity power, the latter being fixed at twenty52
five percent.
45 Council Regulation 2407/92, of 23 July 1992 on Licensing of Air Carriers,
art. 4(2), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1 (EC); see also Commission Decision 95/404, supra
note 44 ("The Commission takes the view that the majority ownership requirement is complied with if at least 50% plus one share of the capital of the air
carrier concerned is owned by Member States and/or national Member States.").
Further, the Commission "refers to a concept of ownership of an undertaking
which is essentially based on the notion of equity capital." Commission Decision
95/404, supra note 44.
46 Regulation 1008/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 September 2008 on Common Rules for the Operation of Air Services in the
Community (Recast), art. 4(f), 2008 OJ. (L 293) 3, 6.
47 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 9(a), 44 Stat. 568 (repealed 1958).
48 Id.
49 Civil Aeronautics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 1107(i) (6), 52 Stat. 973, 1028
(1938) (repealed 1958).
50 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(13), 72 Stat. 731,
737-38 (repealed 1958).
51 In re Acquisition of Nw. Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., No. 46371,
1991 WL 247884, at *6 (Dep't of Transp. Jan. 23, 1991).
52 On the distinction between voting interest and nonvoting interest, see id. at
*5, concerning a case about the acquisition of Northwest Airlines Inc. by Wings
Holdings, Inc.
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Although determining whether an air carrier fulfills the ownership requirement might prove problematic, especially in cases
of privatized, publicly traded companies, the criterion that
seems to matter most in the assessment of the authorities is that
of "effective control. 53 Who actually controls the company (i.e.,
in whose hands its management lies) is an issue to be decided ad
hoc, along the lines, nevertheless, of certain predefined parameters. 54 EC Regulation No. 1008/2008 defines "effective control"
as follows:
[a] relationship constituted by rights, contracts or any other
means which . . .confer the possibility of directly or indirectly

exercising a decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular
by: (a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
(b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on the
composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an undertaking
or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the running of the
business of the undertaking.55
Similarly, pursuant to U.S. law, the notion of "control" relates
to "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise." 56 This requirement has been further fleshed out

by the U.S. Code (U.S.C.), which requires that the "president
and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers" of a U.S. air carrier be U.S. citizens, "which is
under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and in
which at least [seventy-five percent] of the voting interest be
owned" by U.S. citizens.57
It should be noted, nevertheless, that despite the regulatory
provisions in force, the fulfillment of the ownership and control
conditions remains a function of the quality of the bilateral aviation relationship, as well as of vested aeropolitical interests.5"
See, e.g., Luftverkehrsnachweissicherungsgesetz, [Aviation Compliance DocuBUNDESGESETZBLATr 1997 TEL I SEITE 1322, §§ 1, 4
(1997) (setting the requirement that shares in German listed airlines be registered shares with restricted transferability, as opposed to anonymous bearer
shares).
54 Regulation 1008/2008, supra note 46.
55 Id. at 5.
56 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005).
57 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (2), (15) (2006).
58 This is explicitly stated in the 2007 EU-U.S. ATA: "the DOT considers the
totality of circumstances affecting the US airline, and Department precedents
have permitted consideration of the nature of the aviation relationship between
53

mentation Act],June 5, 1997,
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For instance, in 1995, the DOT allowed KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to increase its total equity in its subsidiary Wings Holdings,
Inc. beyond the initially agreed twenty-five percent and up to
forty-nine percent, although Wings had earlier merged with
NWA Inc., the parent company of Northwest Airlines. 9 By contrast, British Airways' attempt a year later to take over U.S. Air
was doomed to fail; despite the DOT's willingness to allow an
equity participation in U.S. Air higher than the statutory thresholds, the reluctance of the U.K. authorities to liberalize its bilateral air services agreement with the United States, set as a
prerequisite for the clearance of the transaction, resulted in a
modest investment and final disinvestment some years later.6 0
The rationale behind the establishment and inclusion of ownership and control clauses in bilateral agreements is not difficult
to ascertain. The Chicago Convention was negotiated and concluded at a moment when the balance of power between the
states of the world was extremely fragile. It suffices to recall that
the Axis nations (Germany, Italy, and Japan) had not been invited to the Conference, while the U.S.S.R. declined to attend
due to the presence of Spain and Portugal. 6 1 Against this backdrop, the ownership and control criteria aimed, in the first instance, at "permit[ing] States to refuse to authorize air services
by air carriers owned or controlled by certain other States."6 2 In
the second instance, the said clauses served:
[T] o establish a link between the air carrier using international
commercial rights and the State to which these rights pertain,
thereby preventing a situation of potentially non-reciprocated
benefits when an air carrier from one State uses another State's
rights; to implement a balance of benefits policy in terms of the
air carriers of the State involved; to ensure, in certain circumstances, that national air carriers do not use the rights of a foreign State to serve their own State.6 3
The establishment of a link between the operating air carrier
and the designating state through the nationality clauses right
the United States and the homeland(s) of any foreign investors." Air Transport
Agreement, May 25, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4, 30.
59 In re Acquisition of Nw. Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., No. 46371,
1991 WL 247884, at *5-6 (Dep't of Transp. Jan. 23, 1991).
60 See Kirsten Bbhmann, The Ownership and ControlRequirements in U.S. and European Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law-Policy; Consideration;Comparison, 66J.
AIR L. & CoM. 689, 703 (2001).
61 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 136.
62 See IAT Manual, supra note 23, at 4.4-1.
63

Id.
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from the outset of civil aviation precluded the appearance of
flags of convenience. In stark contrast with international maritime transport, where the ideal of freedom of the seas has lead
to forum shopping practices, in air transport, airlines fly the flag
of their state of registration.64 The latter nexus serves a multitude of purposes. First, it renders the country of registration
solely responsible for safety and security matters. Moreover, it
leaves no space for free-riding practices, whereby third-country
airlines benefit indirectly by traffic rights and other privileges
negotiated bilaterally by foreign states. Lastly, the exclusive
right of states to designate the carriers eligible to operate on
certain routes aims at safeguarding a balance of benefits vis-a-vis
air carriers, allowing equal participation in air transport activity.
3. Bermuda II, the U.S. Airline Deregulation Act, and First
Generation Open Skies Agreements
The trade of air rights along the lines of the Bermuda I agreement resulted in the conclusion of thousands of bilateral agreements worldwide. The exchange of traffic rights on a quid pro
quo basis, fair and equitable as it is, incentivized the states of the
world to engage in bilateral negotiations and conclude ASAs
with a multitude of aviation states.65 At the same time, the tight
rules on designation of routes and airlines, designed to safeguard equality of operating opportunity for the air carriers of
both nations, prompted national governments to become involved in air transportation activities through the establishment
of their national flag carriers.66 Apart from the United States,
where private airlines appeared right from the outset, in the rest
of the world, and especially in Europe, the tight regulation of
the sector nurtured the creation of national airlines, perceived
as symbols of national pride and prestige.6 7 Enjoying virtual
dominance in their homelands, national champions did not
hesitate to operate international networks, even in the absence
of sufficient volumes of passengers to render these services
profitable.
64

See B6hmann, supra note 60, at 726-27.

65 Pursuant to Articles 81, 82, and 83 of the Chicago Convention, all aeronauti-

cal agreements concluded by contracting parties and their airlines shall be registered with the ICAO. See Welcome to DAGMAR: ICAO's Database of Aeronautical
Agreements and Arrangements, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/applications/dagmar/
main.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
66 See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 131.
67 Id. at 131, 134.
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Three decades following the signing of Bermuda I, though a
dense web of bilateral agreements had emerged, the differing
approaches towards the regulation of the industry espoused by
the United Kingdom and the United States remained unchanged. In 1976, the United Kingdom renounced Bermuda I
and negotiated its more restrictive successor, Bermuda II.6 Bermuda II restricted U.S. carriers' fifth freedom rights, providing
for a mere exchange of third and fourth freedom rights as the
primary objective of international air transport services.69 It further aimed at restricting capacity, closing Heathrow Airport to
competition by allowing access to a maximum of two carriers
from each of the United Kingdom and the United States, and
this only for air services destined for specific U.S. airports.7y
Most interestingly, while under Bermuda I the United States was
entitled to designate both U.S. and U.K airlines and, mutatis mutandis, the United Kingdom was entitled to designate both U.K.
and U.S. airlines, the amended nationality clause under Bermuda II made the system "unilateral," in that substantial ownership and effective control of the airline shall be vested "in the
'
Contracting Party designating the airline or in its nationals."71
The tightening of the rules affected by Bermuda II did not in
reality reflect the evolution of civil aviation in the course of time
and its readiness to undergo structural and operational changes.
In the United States, given the unprofitability of U.S. airlines,
the need for a switch from operative performance to competitive performance7 2 induced Congress to pass the so-called Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.7 The Act phased out federal
regulation of rates, routes, and services for domestic airlines,
Agreement Concerning Air Services, U.S.-U.K.,July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367
[hereinafter Bermuda II].
69 Id. art. 2(1)-(4).
70 Id. art. 3. From 1978 until 1991, a mere three air carriers were operating out
of Heathrow: Pan Am, TWA, and British Airways. A modification of Bermuda II
in 1991 resulted in Pan Am and TWA being succeeded by United Airlines and
American Airlines, as well as the U.K. designating a second airline, Virgin Atlantic. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-97-103, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE U.S.-U.K. MARKET 5-6 (1997). The Bermuda II
arrangement in essence enabled British Airways to dominate the U.S.-U.K. air
passenger segment of the market, capturing the vast part of the traffic. See id. at
4.
71 Bermuda II, supra note 68, art. 3(b) (a); P.P.C. Haanappel, Airline Ownership
and Control, and Some Related Matters, 26 AiR & SPACE L. 90, 93 (2001).
72 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Competition in Air Transport-TheNeed for a Shift in
Focus, 33 TRANsP. L.J. 29, 39 (2005-2006).
73 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
68
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opening up the industry to market forces. 74 Nevertheless, despite its sweeping character, regulatory restrictions on foreign
investment in U.S. airlines remained unchanged. As a result,
the consolidation and rationalization effect of deregulation in
the form of unprecedented mergers and acquisitions was restricted in the U.S. domestic market. Therefore, the status quo
regarding the regulation of international civil aviation stayed
intact.
The deregulation of the U.S. air transport market was coupled with the conclusion of liberal bilateral agreements with a
number of nations. Belgium and the Netherlands were the first
European countries to enter into first generation open skies
agreements with the United States, dispensing with restrictions
on designation of carriers, capacity, and rates, in exchange for
access to the U.S. domestic market. 75 Despite internal criticism
on the promptness with which the United States opened up its
aviation market to foreign airlines without obtaining commensurate benefits for U.S. airlines abroad,76 the beneficial effects of
the Airline Deregulation Act on competition and consumer welfare, expressed in the form of new market entrants and lower
prices, could not go unnoticed on the other side of the Atlantic.
C.

AIR TRANSPORT REGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION
IN EUROPE

Arguably, the deregulation of the U.S. air transport market
caught Europe unprepared in the sense that, since the entering
into force of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EC Treaty) in 1958, no competition regulation had
ever been adopted concerning air transport. As a result, not
only was there no single European air transport market at that
time, but it was not even clear whether the competition provisions of the EC Treaty were applicable in the field of air transport. If the application of the EC Treaty rules to air transport
are traced right from the outset, it should first be underlined
that a common policy in the sphere of transport (CTP or Common Transport Policy) had been set right from the signing of
the EC Treaty as one of the means by which the objectives of the
74 Id.
75 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 152, 155-56.
76 See id. at 157.
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77
IlCommunity, as delineated in Article 2, would be achieved.

lustrative of the "special aspects" ascribed to transport, the treaty
included a separate title regulating transport services. 8 In practice, this meant, as explicitly stated in Article 61 (1) of the EC
Treaty, that transport was excluded79from the treaty provisions
on the freedom to provide services.

In particular, as far as air transport is concerned, a further
derogation from the transport rules was introduced, leaving this
mode of transport outside the scope of Title IV of the EC
Treaty. Article 84(2) granted the European Council (Council)
the discretion to decide "whether, to what extent and by what
procedure appropriate provisions might be adopted for.

. .

air

transport. ''s Thus, the regulation of the sector was contingent
upon positive action by the Council. This special settlement created some controversy over whether air transport was merely excluded from the CTP in the absence of any Council action or
from the EC Treaty as a whole."1
In 1962, the first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty was introduced. 2 A few months later, however,
transport was exempted from its scope of application. 3 On January 1, 1970, the EC Treaty became fully applicable following a
transitional period of twelve years."4 Yet no light was shed on
the controversy in question. The first time the European Court
of Justice (Court) had the chance to rule on the issue was in the
French Seamen's case of 1974.85 After pointing out that the obli-

gation of the Community under Article 2 to establish a common
market referred to the whole of the economic activities of the
Community, the Court clarified that air transport remained, on
the same basis as other modes of transport, subject to the general rules of the EC Treaty."6 In view of the inactivity of the
77 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3(e), Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
In the consolidated version, the treaty refers to air transport's "distinctive features." Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 71, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ. (C 325) 40. In the following discussion,
reference to articles of the EC Treaty correlate to the 1958 treaty.
78 EC Treaty, supra note 77, tit. IV (as in effect 1958).
79 See id. art. 61(1).
80 Id. art. 84(2).
81 See Case 167/73, Comm'n v. French Republic, 1974 E.C.R. 360, 371.
82 Council Regulation 17/62, 1959-62 0.J. SPEC. ED. 87, 87 (EC).
83 Council Regulation 141/62, 1959-62 0J.SPEC. ED. 291, 291 (EC).
84 EC Treaty, supra note 77, art. 8(1) (as in effect 1958).
85 See French Republic, 1974 E.C.R. 360.
86 Id. at 369, 371.
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Council, which had not at that time promulgated any implementing legislation, the Court's ruling in essence highlighted
the Commission of the European Communities' (Commission)
legal and political duty to safeguard the application of the general rules of the treaty to the sector of air transport.8 7 The Commission's reaction to this judgment, as well as to the
deregulation of the U.S. aviation market, led to the adoption in
1979 of a very cautious first memorandum, listing future priorities for the development of the European air transport market,",
followed by a proposal, in 1981, for an implementing regulation
under Article 83 on third country air transport, which was met,
nevertheless, with opposition from the Council. 9
Things started to change radically in 1983 when the Parliament brought an action before the Court against the Council
for failure to act in the field of transport pursuant to Article
175.90 A year later, the Tribunal de Police de Paris sought a
preliminary ruling from the Court on whether certain provisions
of the French civil aviation code were compatible with the competition rules of the EC Treaty. Some days later the Commission published a second, more thorough civil aviation
memorandum, together with a set of proposals, which paved the
92
way for the liberalization of the air transport market.
In 1985, the Parliament's transport case was decided.93 In its
landmark ruling, the Court concluded that the Council failed to
act with regard to the freedom to provide services in the field of
international transport and the laying down of conditions under
which non-resident carriers could operate transport services in a
member state. 94 Soon after the Court's judgment, the Commission presented its White Paper on Completing the Single European Market, setting out a program of legislative measures
87 Abeyratne, supra note 72, at 73.
88 Contribution of the European Communities to the Development of Air Transport Services-Memorandum of the Commission, at 24, COM (1979) 311 final (July 6, 1976).
89 Hubert Drabbe, Directorate-Gen., Competition of the European Comm'n,
Remarks at the 10th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association:
Extension of EU Air Transport Competition Rules to Air Transport to and from
the EU (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/
text/sp1998_058_en.html.
90 Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council, 1985 E.C.R. 1556, 1557.
91 Case 209-213/84, Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1457, 1459.
92 See Commission Proposalfor Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air
Transport Policy, at 13, COM (1984) 72 final (Mar. 15, 1984).
93 See generally Parliament,1985 E.C.R. 1556.
94

Id. at 1600.
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whose main objective for air transport would be the establishment of a more liberalized regime with respect to entry, tariff,
and capacity control.95 The year 1992 was set as the cut-off point
by which a single European aviation market should have been
created.96
This avalanche of developments was without precedent for a
field that for almost twenty-five years had not been subject to
any competition regulation. In 1985, the Advocate General delivered his opinion in the Ministre Public v. Asjes case (commonly known as Nouvelles Fronti6res), confirming the direct
applicability of the competition rules of the EC Treaty in the
absence of any enacted secondary legislation.97 Largely as a result of this opinion, a second case was laid before the Court in
January 1986; the German Federal Court of Justice sought a preliminary ruling on whether Article 86 was, on the same basis as
Article 85, applicable in the field of air transport.98 Asjes was
finally decided in April 1986; the Court ruled that while in principle Article 85 applies to air transport, such application is dependent upon: (1) prior legislative action by the Council,
pursuant to Article 87; or (2) an appropriate Commission decision along the lines of Article 89; or (3) action taken by member
states' authorities pursuant to Article 88. 99
A decisive moment for the history of European integration,
with an immediate impact on aviation, was the enactment in
1987 of the Single European Act (SEA).10 The transition from
unanimity to majority voting streamlined the liberalization of
the market, overcoming the insurmountable obstacle of the
member states' right of veto. 10 1 Despite the Court's prudent
judgment in Asjes and its reluctance to accept the direct applicability of Article 85, after the enactment of the SEA, it was in the
power of the Commission to force the issue. The liberalization
of the air transport market took the form of three packages of
measures, adopted by the Council in 1987, 1990, and 1992.102
In contrast to the United States, where the policy chosen was
95 Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, at 4, COM (1985)
310 final (June 14, 1985).
96 Id.
97 Case 209-213/84, Ministhre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
98 Case
66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekdrmpfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs e.V., 1986 E.C.R. 808.
99 Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1470.
100 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1.
101See, e.g., id. arts. 6, 9, 16.
102 See sources cited infra notes 103, 105-106.
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that of complete deregulation occurring with the adoption of a
single piece of legislation (the Airline Deregulation Act) in Europe, the model advanced was that of controlled liberalization,
occurring gradually over a period of almost ten years.
The first package of air liberalization measures adopted in
1987, although limited in scope, laid down the foundations for
the regulation of the sector on a more competitive basis."°3 In
the meantime, the Court, in view of the new legislation adopted,
re-opened the procedure in the Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur
Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V case (commonly known as
Ahmed Saeed) and, following three hearings, ruled in April 1989
that Article 86 is directly applicable in national courts even in
the absence of implementing legislation.10 4 In 1990, the second
package of measures entered into force,' paving the way for
the final set of measures, effective as of January 1993,106 follow-

ing a period of global economic recession and high fuel prices,
attributable mainly to the Gulf War in the early 1990s. In line
with the ambitious goal of a single European market, the third,
fully-liberalized regulatory package provided uniform standards
for intra-EC market access to EC carriers. 107 Consisting of three
regulations on market access, air fares, and licensing of air carri105 Council Regulation 3975/87, of 14 December 1987 on Laying Down the
Procedure for the Application of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in
the Air Transport Sector, 1987 OJ. (L 374) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 3976/87,
of 14 December 1987 on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain
Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Air Transport Sector,
1987 OJ. (L 374) 9 (EC); Council Directive 87/601, of 14 December 1987 on
Fares for Scheduled Air Services Between Member States, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 12
(EC); Council Decision 87/602, of 14 December 1987 on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air Services Between Member
States and on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled Air-Service Routes Between
Member States, 1987 OJ. (L 374) 19 (EC).
104 Case
66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs e.V., 1986 E.C.R. 838, 848.
105 Council Regulation 2342/90, of 24 July 1990 on Fares for Scheduled Air
Services, 1990 OJ. (L 217) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 2343/90, of 24July 1990
on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled Intra-Community Air Service Routes and
on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air
Services Between Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8 (EC); Council Regulation
2344/90, of 24July 1990 Amending Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and
Concerned Practices in the Air Transport Sector, 1990 OJ. (L 217) 15 (EC).
106 Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 45; Council Regulation 2408/92,
of 23 July 1992 on Access for Community Air Carriers to Intra-Community Air
Routes, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 8 (EC); Council Regulation 2409/92, of 23July 1992
on Fares and Rates for Air Services, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15 (EC).
107 Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 106, art. 3(1).
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ers, the packages opened up to competition all international
routes within the EC.'0 8 However, domestic flights remained
the prerogative of national airlines for four more years, until
1997, when full cabotage rights were extended to all EU
carriers.

09

D.

THE

U.S.

ANSWER TO

EC

LIBERALIZATION

The emergence of a common market in Europe and, in particular, a single air transport market could not but generate action on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States, having
traditionally been d l'avant-garde of the regulation of international civil aviation, realized that the transition from a system of
national ownership and control to a system of community ownership and control had the potential to change the balance of
power between U.S. airlines and European airlines. The notion
of "Community Carrier," a corollary of the freedom of establishment, brought about extensive market access opportunities for
European airlines, which could now serve any route within the
EU. The U.S. reaction to EU liberalization was the launch of its
"open skies" policy.'
As early as mid-1992, before the third air liberalization package entered into force, the United States announced its willingness to offer open skies air services agreements to EU
countries."' These second generation open skies bilaterals
were meant to significantly liberalize international air transport
services by dispensing with the typical restrictions of traditional
bilaterals.' 2 In particular, the new agreements would provide
for:
(1) [o]pen entry on all routes[;] . . (2) [u]nrestricted capacity
and frequency on all routes[;] . . . (3) [u]nrestricted route and
traffic rights [;] . .. (4) [d] ouble-disapproval pricing in Third and
Fourth freedom marketst;] . . . (5) [Liberal charter arrangements[;] . . . (6) [iliberal cargo regime[; . .. (7) [c]onversion
and remittance arrangement[s;] . . . (8) [o] pen code-sharing opportunities[;]

. . . (9) self-handling provisions[;]

.

. . (10)

108 The third package of measures has now been recast and consolidated into a
single regulation. Regulation 1008/2008, supra note 46, at 3.
109Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 106, art. 3(2).
110For a discussion of the U.S. Open Skies policy, see Pablo Mendes de Leon,
Before and After the Tenth Anniversay of the Open Skies Agreement Netherlands-US of
1992, 28 AIR & SPACE L. 280 (2002).

1i1 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 162.
112 Id.
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[p]rocompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities, user
charges, fair competition, and intermodal rights[; and] . . . (11)
[e]xplicit commitment for non-discriminatory operation of and
access to computer reservation systems. 1 3
Nevertheless, despite the significant opening of the industry to
competition, the delicate issues of ownership and control, ninth
freedom rights, and cabotage were not addressed, and were potentially subject to further bilateral negotiations. 1 4
Interestingly, since its inception, the U.S. open skies policy
has been associated with the facilitation of airline alliances. U.S.
authorities made clear from the outset that upon the conclusion
of an open skies agreement, antitrust immunity would be conferred on the parties' airlines either participating in an alliance
or intending to forge an alliance. ' 15 The granting of such immunity by the DOT in essence enables airlines to engage in business practices that under traditional antitrust law are per se
illegal (e.g., price-fixing and revenue pooling). 6 The reason
for the readiness of the United States to legalize even blatant
infringements of its antitrust legislation may be found in its desire to pioneer the liberalization of international air transport in
such a way that the ownership and control regime remained
unchanged.
The first member state to respond positively to the United
States' calls was, naturally, the Netherlands." 7 Building on the
original ATA of 1957 and its amended version, the so-called Protocol of 1978, the parties concluded a Memorandum of Consultations (MoC) in 1992 further liberalizing their bilateral air
transport relations. 18 In November 1992, a couple of months
following the adoption of the MoC, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
and Northwest Airlines, which had already engaged in an alliance arrangement, sought DOT clearance of their "cooperation
and integration" agreement.'1 9 InJanuary 1993, the DOT inau-

13 See In reDefining "Open Skies," No. 48130, 1992 WL 204010, at *2-5 (DOT
Aug. 5, 1992).
114 Adam L. Schless, Comment, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 452 (1994).
115 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 164.
116 Id. at 166.
117 Pablo Mendes de Leon, supra note 110, at 280.
1,8 Id. at 280, 282-89.

119Dempsey, supra note 1, at 164.
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in anticigurated its practice of immunizing alliance agreements
12
pation of a proliferation of similar requests. 1
E.

THE

EC

REACTION TO THE LAUNCH OF

THE U.S. OPEN SKIES POLICY

Soon after the aforementioned MoC, the Commission issued
a communication urging member states to refrain from entering into new air transport arrangements with the United
States. 121 The Commission's efforts to safeguard a mandate
from the Council to initiate negotiations with third countries on
to
behalf of the Community and its member states date back 122
adopted.
was
memorandum
aviation
1979, when its first civil
The 1984 memorandum reiterated the need for a common approach towards international air transport, 12 something that
was strongly supported a decade later by the ComitW des Sages, a
committee of experts set up by the Commission to analyze the
situation of EC civil aviation and make recommendations for future policy initiatives.1 24 In view of the completion of the air
liberalization process in Europe, the committee underlined that
bilaterals "ignore the new realities" and should be replaced by a
multilateral regime directed by the EU-and in particular by
25
the European Commission-rather than the member states.1
Despite the Commission's repeated requests to the contrary,
six member states-Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria-signed open skies agreements with the
25
United States in May 1995, followed a year later by Germany.1
In view of the Council's unwillingness to empower the Commission to negotiate en bloc with the United States and given the
growing success of the U.S. open skies policy, the Commission
initiated infringement proceedings against the aforementioned
member states and the United Kingdom, which, while not entering into an open skies agreement, proceeded with an amend120 Joint Application of Nw. Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for
Approval and Antitrust Immunity, No. 48342, at 12 (DOT Jan. 11, 1993).
12, Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council RegardingAir Transport Relations with Third Countries, at 21, COM (1992) 434 final (Oct. 21, 1992).
122 Contributionof the European Communities to the Development of Air Transport Services-Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 88, at 15.
123 Commission Proposalfor Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air
Transport Policy, supra note 92.
124 Comit6 des Sages, Expanding Horizons: Civil Aviation in Europe, an Action Programmefor the Future, at 5 (Jan. 1994), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/8690/.
125 Id. at 33-34.
126 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 168-69.
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ment of its Bermuda II agreement with the United States.12 7 It
was only after the latter action that the Council agreed, in mid1996, to give the Commission a limited mandate to initiate preliminary talks on a multilateral air transport agreement. 128
However, the Council's concessions-a product of last minute
compromises-soon proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Commission. The mandate's limited scope, covering only the socalled "soft-rights" (i.e., computer reservations systems, slot allocation, maintenance, O&C, code-sharing, leasing, competition
issues, environmental issues, dispute resolution, and transitional
measures), was considered insufficient by the United States as a
basis for negotiations. 129 The latter made clear that a partial
agreement was unacceptable and that as long as the hard issues
of market access, capacity, airline designation, and pricing had
not been included in the agenda, no further progress could be
made. 3 ° In the face of the Council's consistent refusal to consent to a comprehensive mandate and given the initiation of
open skies negotiations between the United States and four new
member states (the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Portugal),
the Commission reactivated its infringement proceedings under
former Article 226 of the EC Treaty.1 3 1 In 2001, following the
member states' refusal to comply with the Commission's reasoned opinion, the latter took its legal action to the next level,
1 32
referring its cases to the Court.
Having been called on by the Commission to decide:
+ whether the Community had exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude open skies agreements with the U.S.
and, if so, to what extent, and
+ whether the nationality clauses typically included in bilateral air services agreements violate the freedom of establishment enshrined in Article 43,133
the Court handed down its individual judgments for all eight
cases in November 2002.134 The starting point of the Commis127
128

Id. at 181-82, 186-87.
Id. at 182.

129 Id.
130

Id.

Id. at 183 & n.256.
See, e.g., Case C-467/98, Comm'n v. Kingdom of Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09519.
1 For an analysis of the open skies judgments, see Liz Heffernan & Conor
McAuliffe, External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: The Court of Justice and the
Open Skies Agreements, 28 EUR. L. Rv. 601 (2003).
134 Case C-466/98, Comm'n v. U.K., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09427; Case C-467/98, Kingdom of Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09519; Case C-468/98, Comm'n v. Kingdom of Swed.,
131

132
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sion's rationale against the open skies agreements was their potential to undermine the outcome of the liberalization process
(i.e., the establishment of a single European air transport market). In the Commission's perception, the creation of such a
common market implied the conferral on the Community of
the power to conclude air services agreements with third countries'on behalf of the member states. 3 5 Such exclusive external
power was indispensable for the interests of the Community and
the individual member states to be properly safeguarded. In
fact, the limited negotiating leverage of the individual member
states resulted in a disequilibrium of traffic rights in favor of the
U.S. carriers, in that the exchange of traffic rights enabled U.S.
carriers to fly from any point in Europe, while obliging European carriers to operate only from their home bases-open
skies agreements being always bilateral agreements. In addition,
the prohibition of cabotage services in the United States further
reduced the options of European airlines when they exercised
their beyond rights.
Moreover, the Commission argued that the nationality clauses
included in all open skies agreements and in the U.S.-U.K. bilateral agreement impinged upon the fundamental principle of
freedom of establishment, enshrined in Article 43 and, therefore, had to be abolished.1 "6 The completion of the liberalization process in Europe, and, in particular, the adoption of
Regulation 2407/92 on licensing of air carriers, marked the
transition from nationally owned and controlled airlines to community owned and controlled airlines. The right of establishment entailed the obligation of the member states' aeronautical
authorities to grant an operating license to any airline that was
majority owned and effectively controlled by a member state of
the Community or its nationals. 11 7 The nationality clauses, by
reserving such designation for the airlines of the country of designation exclusively, violated the freedom of establishment.' 38
2002 E.C.R. 1-09575; Case C-469/98, Comm'n v. Republic of Fin., 2002 E.C.R. I09635; Case C-471/98, Comm'n v. Kingdom of Belg., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09681; Case
C-472/98, Grand Duchy of Lux., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09741; Case C-475/98, Comm'n v.
Republic of Austria, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09797; Case C-476/98, Comm'n v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09855.
135 See, e.g., Case C-467/98, Kingdom of Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09519,
44-49,
65-72.
113-15.
136 Id.
2407/92, supra note 45, art. 2; Council Regulation
137 Council Regulation
2408/92, supra note 106, art. 3(1).
113-16.
138 Case C-467/98, Kingdom of Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09519,
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According to the Commission, the net result of this described
discrimination on the basis of nationality was the distortion of
competition between Community Carriers, as well as the prevention of the consolidation of the industry through mergers and
acquisitions. That was so because the latter transactions, by reshuffling airlines' ownership and control, could jeopardize traffic rights exchanged bilaterally with third countries on the basis
of the nationality principle.
Contrary to the Commission's contention that Article 80(2)
constituted the legal basis for its exclusive external competence
in the field of air transport, the Court clarified that the said provision, while empowering the Council to confer such an authority on the Community, did not in itself establish such an
authority. 139 The Court further examined whether the Community's external competence could be implied from the completion of the European common air transport market.140 In
examining the internal rules adopted and whether the open
skies agreements jeopardized or could jeopardize the objectives
of these rules, the Court concluded that to the extent the Licensing and Market Access Regulations applied exclusively to
Community Carriers and by no means to carriers of third countries, no exclusive external competence of the Community
could be substantiated. 4 Therefore, the member states retained their competence to conclude air services agreements
with third countries. 142 Nevertheless, the Court identified three
areas where the common rules adopted had deprived the member states of their right to assume obligations towards third
countries, conferring, as a consequence, exclusive competence
on the Community. 4 3 These areas pertained to the setting of
fares and rates for intra-Community routes, computer reservation systems, and slot allocation. Given that none of the open
skies agreements under scrutiny contained rules on slot allocation, the member states had only trespassed on the Community's competence with regard to the remaining two issues.
However, as far as the nationality clauses were concerned, the
Court upheld the Commission's view as to their illegality. 44
Given that the ownership and control clauses authorized the
139

54-55.

140 Id.

60.

Id. 7
7
141 Id. 7
142 Id. 7
143 Id. 7
I- Id. 1

61-62.
63-64.
96-108.
222-33.

2011]

TRANSATLANTIC AIR TRANSPORT MARKET

687

United States to withdraw, suspend, or limit the operating licenses or technical authorizations of Community airlines owned
and controlled by a member state other than the contracting
one under the open skies agreement, Community airlines suffered discrimination on the basis of nationality. As a result, the
freedom of establishment could not be exercised properly. 45
The open skies judgments of the Court could not but streamline developments in the field of regulation of international air
transport. While the member states were by no means deprived
of their privilege under public international law to conclude air
services agreements with third countries, unless the very few issues of exclusive Community competence were concerned, they
were under a concrete legal obligation to amend their open
skies agreements in so far as they were declared illegal and abstain from committing the same infringements in the future.14 6
The Court's ruling, though addressed to the defendant member
states, created an obligation for all member states to renegotiate
their bilateral agreements in order to align them with Community law.14 7 Given the dense web of bilateral agreements created
over the years, all of which contained nationality clauses, the
challenge of negotiating with third countries was evidently
great. Convincing third countries to consent to a Community
Carrier designation clause was not only a matter of legal obligation, but also of extreme commercial importance. 148 The legal
uncertainty that would be generated by a possible refusal of
third countries to consent as to the validity of the bilaterals, as
well as the traffic rights at stake in the event of unilateral denunciation of the ASAs, highlighted the need for delicate handling
of the matter.
In June 2003, the Council, in response to the legal pressure,
granted the Commission the long-sought comprehensive mandate to negotiate with the United States and other third countries. 149 Along the lines of the Commission's package of
Id.
See Proposalfor a European Parliamentand Council Regulation on the Negotiation
and Implementation of Air Service Agreements Between Member States and Third Countries, COM (2003) 94 final (Feb. 2, 2003).
147 Case C-469/98, Comm'n v. Republic of Fin., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09635, 11 7-8.
9-13.
14 Id.
149 Press Release, European Comm'n, New Era for Air Transport: Loyola de
Palacio Welcomes the Mandate Given to the European Comm'n for Negotiating
an Open Aviation Area with the U.S. (IP/03/806), at 1 (June 5, 2003); see also
Allan I. Mendelsohn, The USA and the EU - Aviation Relations: An Impasse or an
Opportunity?, 29 AIR & SPACE L. 263, 268 (2004).
145
146
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proposals communicated in February 2003, the mandate authorized the Commission:
+ "to open negotiations with the United States" for the establishment of an "Open Aviation Area";
+ "to open negotiations with third countries [for] the replacement of certain provisions in existing bilateral agreements with a Community agreement;" and
+ to prepare "a proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the negotiation and implementation of air service agreements between member
150
[s]tates and third countries.'
The idea of creating a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
(TCAA), underpinned by the notion that liberalization and harmonization of competitive conditions must go hand in hand, belongs to the Association of European Airlines (AEA).' 5'
Inspired by the establishment of a single air transport market in
Europe, following the liberalization of the industry, the AEA envisaged, in 1995, the replication of this model in the transatlantic market. 152 The AEA's vision was soon espoused by the
Commission, which affirmed that
It]he common transatlantic area will create the biggest liberalised airspace in the world: any airline, European or American,
will be able to operate freely without restrictions on traffic rights,
subject to compliance with the rules agreed between the parties
on competition, safety, and the environment.
These rules will be
1 53
administered by common bodies.
Interestingly, the concept of a TCAA was later replaced with that
of an "Open Aviation Area" (OAA). The reasons behind this
seem to be of both a practical and a political nature. A TCAA,
geographically defined as it is, does not allow for future expansion through the accession of third countries. Moreover, it
might come across as some kind of enlargement of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), an idea not cherished by
the United States.
The raison d 'tre of the general mandate enabling the Commission to negotiate Community-level agreements with third countries was obviously the correction of the legal problems
150

Id.

Open Skies: The EU-US Air Transport Agreement, Ass'N EUR. AIRLINES, http://
files.aea.be/News/News02O4O8.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
152 Id.
153 Commission White Paperon European TransportPolicy for 2010: Time to Decide, at
100, COM (2001) 370 final (Sept. 12, 2001).
151
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highlighted by the Court and especially the substitution of updated EU clauses for traditional nationality provisions. The
alignment of the many hundreds of existing bilaterals with EU
standards constituted a real challenge to the extent it required
not only the joint action of the Commission and the member
states, but also the willingness of the third countries involved to
cooperate. In this regard, it was deemed necessary that the
member states could negotiate not only in their own areas of
competence, but also on issues subject to the horizontal mandate granted to the Commission. To eliminate the risk of inconsistencies, the Commission prepared a standard designation
article to replace the15 4old O&C clauses to which the member
states had to adhere.

Lastly, Regulation 847/2004155 provided the framework for individual negotiations between member states and foreign states
either for the establishment of a new ASA or for the modification of an existing one. Although Regulation 847/2004 affirmed the right of member states to retain control of virtually
all aspects of the international commitments they assumed, it
rendered the standard EU clauses a sine qua non for all agreements.156 A system of notification by member states and Commission approval, as well as the active participation of other
stakeholders in the ASA-making process, was provided for as the
against discrimination between Community
necessary safeguard
7
5

Carriers.1

F. FIRST-STAGE EU-U.S.

AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

Soon after the Council's mandate, representatives of the two
biggest aviation markets in the world announced their agreement to begin comprehensive negotiations "with the goal of
maximising benefits for consumers, airlines, and communities
on both sides of the Atlantic. ' 1

5

Right from the outset, the EU

institutions made clear that they were not willing to accept a
154 Press Release, European Comm'n, 2515th Council Meeting: Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy (9686/03), at 19-20 (June 5, 2003).
155See Regulation 847/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
29 April 2004 on the Negotiation and Implementation of Air Service Agreements
Between Member States and Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 7.

Id. art. 1.
157See generally id. arts. 1-2.

156

158 Press Release, European Comm'n, European Union and the United States
of America Agree on Opening Negotiations on Open Aviation Area (IP/03/897),
at 1 (June 25, 2003).
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minimalist "early harvest" agreement. 5 ' On the other hand, the
United States, having negotiated and actually safeguarded an expanded network of access points in Europe thanks to its open
skies agreements with many member states, campaigned for a
multinationalization of the O&C clauses.16 ° However, despite
the clash of interests between the two parties, the reality of the
Court's verdict and the consequences that choosing not to act
would have had for both aviation markets brought the two parties to the negotiating table with the concrete and time-limited
goal of reaching an operational consensus.
An EU-U.S. agreement could not have had any other goal
other than the restructuring of the industry in such a way as to
allow for efficient cross-border cooperation. The first obvious
obstacle to be overcome was the O&C restrictions, as well as the
cabotage limitations. The European solution put forward to get
around these problems, which also constituted an interesting insight into the future of civil aviation in general, was the concept
of an OAA. 6 ' The replacement of the old system of traffic
rights with a new one of unlimited access, whereby any licensed
airline, either European or American, would be able to operate
freely within an open aviation area, subject only to commonly
agreed rules on operational safety, security, competition, and
environmental protection, 62 has been modeled on a three-tier,
rather phased structure. Matters on which a consensus could be
reached fairly easily would be addressed first.163 Matters whose
treatment could take the form of mutual recognition, and as
such would be more time-consuming, would follow.' 64 Finally,
the most contentious and complex aviation issues would be left
for the end of the negotiation efforts.' 65 As their successful tackling is dependent to a great degree upon prior legislative

159 Directorate-General for Energy & Transp. European Comm'n, Information
Note on Air Transport Agreement Between the EU and US, at 1 (Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter European Comm'n, Information Note].
160 Mendelsohn, supra note 149, at 265, 269.

16, Christian Hofer & Martin Dresner, The United States-European Union Open
Aviation Area: The American Perspective, 46J. TRANsp. REs. F. 129, 131 (2007).
162 See id.
163 See id. at 133.
164 Second Stage EU-US "Open Skies" Agreement and Existing First Stage Air Services
Agreement - Briefing, EU Bus. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://eubusiness.com/topics/
transport/open-skies.2/.
165 Id.
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changes, the third phase of the negotiations is expected to last
longer. 166
The United States, for its part, came up with an alternative
proposal, based on the immediate adoption of an open skies
policy, on the replacement of the nationality clauses with a nondiscriminatory EU clause, and on the extension of the twentyfive percent foreign ownership of U.S. airlines threshold to
forty-nine percent. The underlying reason for the U.S. proposal
was Heathrow airport. 167 Implementation of the U.S. open skies
regime would entail the opening up of Heathrow to players
other than the ones monopolizing its slots up until that time
(i.e., British Airways and Virgin Atlantic on the one hand and
American Airlines and United Airlines on the other). 6 ' While
this prospect would be optimal for the United States, which
steadily supported the obsolescence of the Bermuda II agreement, it faced opposition from the United Kingdom, which had
an interest in keeping access to Heathrow limited. With the
United Kingdom passionately "lobbying" its case, the U.S. proposal was bound to fail.
Nevertheless, the negotiations were not interrupted. On November 18, 2005, the EU and the United States reached a compromise on the text of an inter-partes open skies agreement,
which was seen as a first stage in opening markets and enhancing cooperation. 169 Initially, the success of the venture appeared contingent upon the DOT's ability to convince Congress
to approve its Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM).' 70 The
NPRM, issued in November 2005, covered the "actual control"
criterion, relaxing the current limits and thus paving the way for
easier access to foreign capital for U.S. air carriers.17 ' The
agreement, being of mixed nature, needed to be ratified by
both the Community and the member states. The Council of
Transport made clear that its decision would be dependent
upon the outcome of the U.S. rulemaking process and stressed
the importance of "clear, meaningful[] and robust policy

Id.
167 Hofer & Dresner, supra note 161, at 131, 134-35.
166

168

Id. at 135.

169 European Comm'n, Information Note, supra note 159.
170Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (proposed Nov. 7,
2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 204, 399).
171 Id.
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changes" in the area of foreign control of U.S. airlines. 172 However, as probably expected, the adoption of the rule met significant opposition from Congress, in response to which the DOT
issued a modified proposal in May 2006 and allowed for further
time for consultation. 173 Despite the efforts of the U.S. administration to educate both Congress and the American public to
dissociate national security and defense considerations from the
issue of O&C, the opposition continued, obliging 7the DOT to
formally withdraw its proposal in December 2006,1 1
The rather discouraging, albeit to some extent expected, outcome of the DOT's educational efforts did not hinder the Council from requesting the Commission to enter into urgent
consultations with the United States, seeking elements that
could be used to restore a proper balance of interests. After
three rounds of negotiations since the beginning of 2007, and in
total eleven rounds of negotiations lasting for four years, the two
sides reached the ATA, initialed on March 2, 2007, and finally
signed on April 30, 2007 in Washington D.C. at the EU-U.S.
Transatlantic Summit. 1 75 The European Parliament welcomed

the draft agreement "as an important step toward[ ] an integrated transatlantic aviation market" to the benefit of consumers, 76 while the Commission hailed the first-stage treaty as "a
centrepiece for a reinvigorated transatlantic
relationship" and a
177
big step forward in international aviation.
The first-stage agreement, which became effective on March
30, 2008, following a period of provisional application, super172 ProcedureFilefor the EC/United States Agreement: Air Services, Replacing the Bilateral Agreements by a Community Agreement, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5336262 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
173 European Comm'n, Information Note, supra note 159, at 3-4.
174 See id.
175Press Release, European Comm'n, EU-US Open Skies: A New Era in Transatlantic Aviation Starts on 30 March (IP/08/474) (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/08/474], available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/474&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, European Parliament, Open
Skies EU-US Agreement - MEPs Call for It to Be Endorsed (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT
+IM-PRESS+20070309BRI03996+ITEM-004-EN OC+XML+V//EN&language
=EN; Press Release, European Comm'n, Open Sky: Jacques Barrot Welcomes the
Draft Aviation Agreement Reached by the EU-US Negotiators (IP/07/277), at 1
(Mar. 2, 2007), [hereinafter Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/07/277],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-portal/international/pillars/
global-partners/doc/us/press release_020307.pdf.
176 Press Release, European Parliament, supra note 175.
177 Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/07/277, supra note 175.
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seded the existing bilaterals, putting an end to the fragmentation of the regulatory framework.178 All EU member states,
irrespective of whether they had in the past signed a bilateral air
services agreement with the United States, are now bound by
common rules along the lines of the recognition by the United
States of all European airlines as "Community air carriers."1 79 In
practice, this paves the way for the consolidation of the European air transport market through mergers and acquisitions as
it preempts the danger of traffic rights being lost as a result of
changes in the airlines' O&C regime following a merger. 80
In terms of market access, in addition to unlimited third,
fourth, and fifth freedom rights, provided for already by the preliminary 2005 agreement, limited seventh freedom passenger
rights and unlimited all-cargo rights were for the first time introduced for EU airlines exclusively."8 ' In line with the parties' desire to promote an international aviation system based on
competition in the marketplace with minimum government interference, no restrictions were introduced on the frequency
and capacity of the services offered. l 2 Moreover, with the exception that U.S. carriers are not allowed to price-lead on intraEU routes, free pricing was established. 3 Market access was
combined with a spectrum of commercial opportunities for airlines to enter, inter alia, into blocked-space or code-sharing
agreements, franchising or branding arrangements, as well as
wet-leasing arrangements." 4 Additionally, Community Carriers
are granted the right to participate in the U.S. "Fly America"
program provided that the transportation of passengers and
cargo at stake is financed by a U.S. government civilian department, as opposed to a military department.185 Lastly, guarantees
have been granted that applications for antitrust immunity with
178Memorandum, European Comm'n, Negotiations on a Second Stage EU-US
"Open Skies" Agreement and Existing First Stage Air Services Agreement - Frequently Asked Questions (MEMO/10/74), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
Memorandum, European Comm'n, MEMO/10/74].
179 Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/07/277, supra note 175, at 2.
180Commission Decision of 11 February 2004 in Case COMP/M.3280-Air
France/KLM, 2004 O.J. (L 60) 5.
181Directorate-Gen. Energy & Transp., European Comm'n, EU/US First-Stage
Air Transport Agreement Presentation, at 4, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/air/international_aviation/countryindex/doc/2007_03_27_back
ground-briefing-slides.pdf.
182 Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 3(4).
183 Id. art. 13.
184
185

Id. art. 10(7)-(9).
Id. at 41 & annex 3.
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regard to airline agreements and cooperative arrangements will
be given "fair and expeditious consideration.

' 18 6

In practice,

this means that Community airlines qualify for ATI under the
ATA.
Although the first-stage agreement constitutes a brave step
forward in the area of market access, it does not go so far as to
open up domestic markets to competition. On the contrary, the
ATA makes it clear that cabotage is not conferred on either
party's airlines.18 Yet, the explicit prohibition of cabotage is far
from symmetrical if one considers that the European airspace
has constituted a large cabotage area since 1997.188 In practice,

this means that although U.S. airlines are allowed to carry traffic
between any two domestic EU points, provided of course that
the latter do not belong to the same member state, EU airlines
do not enjoy equivalent rights in the United States.
Arguably, an effective way to achieve widespread market access is to relax the O&C thresholds in the parties' respective legislation. The agreement introduced an extended ownership
clause, whereby the eventuality of EU ownership of fifty percent
or more of the total equity of a U.S. airline should not be excluded, but "considered on a case-by-case basis."'1 9 Such an extension is, nevertheless, effectively preempted by being subject
to the unequivocal statement that said ownership should not be
presumed to constitute control of that airline.1 90 O&C being
two sides of the same coin, it is difficult to see how the new
clause could ever incentivize the free flow of capital. While the
ATA changed very little, if anything at all, in the O&C regimethe O&C limitations in the parties' national legislations having
stayed intact-it introduced an interesting provision on the
O&C of third-country airlines. Specifically, if third-country airlines are substantially owned by either EU or U.S. nationals,
neither party should disallow their designation on the basis of
the ASA signed with the third country concerned.19 1 Moreover,
the United States unilaterally assumed the obligation not to oppose the designation of airlines of Liechtenstein, Switzerland,
the ECAA, or any African country that has entered into an open
186 Id.

48, at 40.

187 Id. annex 5.
188 See Nils Danklefsen, Air Transport: Market Access, EUR. PARLIAMENT,

2008), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU-4.6.5.pdf.
189 Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, annex 4, art. 1 (b).
190 See id.
191 Id. annex 4, art. 2.
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skies agreement with the United States on the grounds that
their effective control is vested in EU interests.1 92 Apart from its
practical value, the provision in question indirectly, but effectively, broadens the ATA's scope of application. This is in line
with the parties' expressed will to extend the ATA to include
93
third countries.
Its most interesting feature is that it provides for extensive regulatory cooperation over a range of areas: security, safety, competition, government subsidies, and environment. 9 4 The
realization that the viability of a final agreement is dependent
upon a degree of regulatory convergence necessitated not only
the adoption of these provisions but also the establishment of a
joint committee, a body consisting of representatives of the parties entrusted with the task of reviewing the application of the
ATA and resolving, where necessary, questions relating to its interpretation and application.' 9 5 In the event that a dispute is
not settled by the Joint Committee, it may be referred to arbitration, unless competition issues are concerned, in which case the
authorities in charge are the Commission and the DOT.19 6
In line with the EU negotiating mandate and in order to ensure progression to subsequent stages, the first-stage agreement
"contain[ed] a strong mechanism for" phase-two agreement
197
within a strictly defined timescale and a list of priority items.
Along the lines of this mechanism, second-stage negotiations
were initiated on May 15, 2008, soon after the successful launch
of the first-stage EU-U.S. ATA on March 30, 2008.98 The key
issues under discussion pertained to "further liberalization of
traffic rights," "additional foreign investment opportunities,"
"environmental measures and infrastructure constraints," further access to Fly America, and wet-leasing. 99 A last minute addition to the ATA was a suspension clause whereby each party
reserved the right to suspend rights specified in the ATA if no
second-stage agreement was reached by November 20 10.20 Although the suspension clause was included in the ATA at the
192

Id.

See id. art. 21.
See id. arts. 8, 9, 14, 15, 20.
195 See id. art. 18.
196 See id. arts. 18, 19.
197 Id. art. 21; Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/08/474, at 1, supra note
175.
198 Memorandum, European Comm'n, MEMO/10/74, supra note 178, at 2.
199 Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 21(2).
200 Id. art. 21(3).
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insistence of the EU, which wanted to ensure that the United
States would not simply rely on the acquis of the first-stage agreement, stalling further negotiations, it may be seen as a lever of
pressure on both sides to further broaden the scope of aviation

liberalization .201
G.

SECOND-STAGE

EU-U.S.

AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

As wished for, the negotiations continued to come to fruition
on March 25, 2010, when a Protocol to Amend the Air Transport Agreement (Protocol) was adopted. 20 2 The initialing of the
second-stage agreement was followed by its formal adoption by
the Council of Transport Ministers on June 24, 2010, and its
official signing by the United States, the EU member states, and
the European Commission on the same day.20 3
The second-stage agreement is arguably not far-reaching in
terms of its contribution to the establishment of an OAA. In
terms of market access, very little changed. Domestic cabotage
remained a "national" privilege, while traffic rights were not further liberalized. 2 4 Nevertheless, in the area of U.S. Government Procured Transportation a slight improvement did occur
to the extent that EU airlines were granted the right to offer
services between the United States and non-EU countries (as opposed to services solely between the United States and EU countries, which was the case before).205
The thorniest issue on the list of priority items defined by the
parties in Article 21 of the 2007 ATA was that of additional foreign investment opportunities.20 6 It would not be an exaggeration to contend that, as in the area of liberalization of traffic
rights, lip service was paid to this item too. Thus, the EU and its
member states undertook to allow majority ownership and effective control of their airlines by the United States or its nationals
on the basis of reciprocity, upon confirmation by the Joint Committee that the laws and regulations of the United States permit
201 See EU-US 'Open Skies' Agreement, EuRACTIV.COM, http://www.euractiv.com/
transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-167482 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
202 Protocol to Amend the Air Transport Agreement Between the United
States of America and the European Community and Its Member States, Mar. 25,
2010, 2010 OJ. (L 223) 3, 15 [hereinafter ATA Protocol].
203 Press Release, Council of European Union, 3024th Council Meeting:
Transp. Telecomms. & Energy, at 7 (June 24, 2010).
204 ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 6(4).
205 Compare id. art. 7, with Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, annex 3.
206 See Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 21.
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majority ownership and effective control of its airlines by the
member states or their nationals. 7 To the extent that no new
concrete8 obligations were assumed, the issue was effectively left
20
intact.
Unlike the issue of wet-leasing, which was given no consideration by the parties in the second-stage agreement despite its inclusion in the list of priority items in Article 21 of the ATA,
environmental matters were addressed by the second-stage
agreement. 209 A new, expanded provision on the environment
was adopted, accompanied by ajoint Statement on Environmental Cooperation and some eight paragraphs in the MoC dedicated to the environment. 210 The new provisions provide for
regulatory cooperation in a range of environmental issues, often
within the framework of the ICAO or the United Nations.2 1'
The Commission stated that the changes introduced
will strengthen cooperation on environmental matters by requiring the compatibility and interaction of market-based measures
(such as emission trading schemes) to avoid duplication; by pro-

moting greater transparency for noise-based airport measures;
and by enhancing green technologies, fuels[,] and air traffic
management. This cooperation is key to effectively decarbonising international aviation.212
An area that, although not earmarked for consideration in
the list of priority items, found its way into the new Protocol is
that of aviation security.21 3 The proclaimed enhanced cooperation between the parties' (respective) regulatory and other authorities aims at achieving a balance between efficiency, on the
one hand, and security, on the other hand.2 1 4 The need to facil-

itate air transportation in the most economical way, without
compromising aviation security, may only be satisfied through a
high level of cooperation. The latter may take the form of mu207 ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 6(2).

Compare id., with Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, annex 4, art. 1.
See ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 3; see also Air Transport Agreement,
supra note 58, art. 21.
210 ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 3 & pp. 16-17 & attachment c.
208
209

211 Id.
212 Press Release, European Comm'n, Breakthrough in EU-US Second-Stage
Open Skies Negotiations: Vice-President Kallas Welcomes Draft Agreement (IP/
10/371), at 2 (Mar. 25, 2010) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Press Release,
European Comm'n, IP/10/371].
213 SeeATA Protocol, supra note 202, at 16 & art. 5(4) (h), (j).

214

See id. at 16.

698

JOURNAL OF AIR LA W AND COMMERCE

tual reliance on the other party's security measures, as well as
swift and coordinated responses to new threats.21 5
An innovation of the 2010 Protocol is a provision entitled "Social Dimension. "216 The creation of transnational companies as
a corollary to market liberalization has raised concerns as to possible negative implications for labor. 217

The new provision

could be seen as a commitment or an affirmation that "[tihe
opportunities created by the Agreement are not intended to undermine labour standards or the labour-related rights and principles contained in the Parties' respective laws. "218 In this
respect, an important role has been reserved for the joint committee to the extent that the latter is entrusted with the task of
monitoring "the social effects of the Agreement and the development of appropriate responses to [legitimate] concerns. "219
Despite the Commission's statement that the provision "will not
only ensure that the existing legal rights of airline employees are
preserved, but that the implementation of the agreement contributes to high labour standards," the selection of the verb "intended" in the relevant Article 17(1) may, in practice, prove
problematic.22 °
In recognition of the fact that the success of the Protocol presupposes a high degree of regulatory cooperation, the role of
the Joint Committee appears enhanced. This is so not only because further issues are brought within the remit of the committee's powers, 22 1 but also because the committee has now been

authorized to develop "arrangements for the reciprocal recognition of regulatory determinations" 22 2-an

authorization that

under the 2007 ATA had only been granted with regard to airline fitness and citizenship. 223 This is arguably a very modest but
important step forward, as it might contribute to the ultimate

216

See id. at 16, art. 5(4) (h), (j).
See id. art. 4.

217

See

215

CLAUDE CHIRNE,

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE EUROPEAN COMM'N, TRANSAT-

LANTIC TRANS-NATIONAL AIRLINE COMPANIES: TAKING ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL ISSUES,

at 4 (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/internationalaviation/countryindex/doc/us_2009_11_10chene-report.pdf.
218 ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 4(1).
219 See id. art. 4(2).
220 Press Release, European Comm'n,IP/10/371, supra note 212; seeATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 4(1).
221 See, e.g., ATA Protocol, supra note 202, arts. 4(2), 5.
222 See id. art. 5(4) (e).
223 Compare Air Transport Agreement, supranote 58, art. 18, with ATA Protocol,
supra note 202, arts. 2, 5(4)(e).
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goal of regulatory convergence, if not, ideally, regulatory
harmonization.
The conclusion of the second-stage agreement and its entry
into force leads inexorably to the question of whether a final
agreement is going to be reached, and, if so, when. Arguably, a
crucial difference between the first-stage and second-stage
agreements is that although in the 2007 ATA the parties agreed
on a timeframe within which certain issues had to be resolved,
in the 2010 Protocol no such provision was included and, consequently, no suspension clause applies anymore. 224 Although it

might be considered justified in view of the delicacy of the issues
that have to be handled and finally settled in the final stage of
the negotiations and, as such, in line with the EU mandate, the
possibility remains that the parties will procrastinate further developments and eventually settle for the 2010 acquis.
H.

TOwARD

SECOND GENERATION OPEN SKIES JUDGMENTS?

Unlike the United States, which has never (at least officially)
contested the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the legality of the nationality clauses under EU law, and therefore, the
binding force of its judgments erga at least the member states,
Russia is one of the few countries in the world that refuses to
recognize the EU designation clauses and, thus, indirectly the
authority of the Court to bind member states in their relations
with third countries. 225 As a result, the member states' bilateral
agreements with Russia have not been updated following the
open skies judgments, Russia exercising its right not to allow the
designation of airlines that are not majority owned and effectively controlled by the other contracting party or its nationals.
Russia's insistence on the status quo ante the open skies judgments creates problems not only when member states want to
designate EU airlines established in their respective territories,
which, nevertheless, are not owned and controlled by them or
their nationals, but also in cases of airline mergers. 226 Following
the takeover of Austrian Airlines by Lufthansa, for instance, Russia "argue [d] that flights operated by Austrian Airlines to Russia
would no longer be covered by the ASA between Austria and
Compare Air Transport Agreement, supranote 58, art. 21, with ATA Protocol,
supra note 202, art. 6.
225 See Memorandum, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Infringements Concerning Bilateral Aviation Agreements with Russia (MEMO/11/167 ) (Mar. 14,
2011) [hereinafter Memorandum, European Comm'n, MEMO/11/167].
226 See id. at 2.
224
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Russia because the airline was no longer owned by Austrian in-

terests. ' 227 As the Commission noted, "To the extent that 'traf-

fic rights' for flying over Russian territory are so far only granted
for short time periods, this creates uncertainty as to whether
Austrian Airlines - not being recognized as an 'EU carrier' 228
might continue to have the right to fly over Russian territory.
Obviously, similar considerations arise in all intra-EU airline
merger and acquisition cases (e.g., so far, British Airways/Iberia,
Lufthansa/Brussels Airlines, Lufthansa/British Midlands, and
Air France/KLM).229

To Russia's reluctance to recognize the notion of "EU carrier"
and therefore allow for EU designation clauses substituting for
traditional nationality clauses, one could also add Russia's practice of imposing charges on EU airlines for Siberian overflights.

230

In particular, EU airlines overflying Siberia on their

way to Asian destinations are obliged to pay special royalties,
most of them directly to the Russian airline Aeroflot. 2 1 According to the European Commission, in 2008 alone EU carriers
were subjected to charges of approximately $420 million.232
The Siberian overflights issue is not new and has constituted an
area of tension for a considerable period of time. "In May 2004,
the Russian government submitted a commitment to the European Commission, according to which the system of overflight
payments would be abolished and modernised by December
2013 at the latest.

'233

In March 2006, the Commission was man-

dated by the Council
to negotiate an agreement with the Russian government
assuring[:]
+ the complete abolition of payments at the latest by 31 December 2013;
+ progressive reduction of payments during the transition period from 2006 onwards;
+ the end of mandatory commercial agreements related to
the overflight of the territory of the Russian Federation by
2013 at the latest;

231

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.

232

Id.

233

See InternationalAviation: Russia, EUR.

227
228

229
230

COMM'N: MOBILITY

& TRANSP. http://

ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international aviation/country_index/russiaen.
htm, (last updated Oct. 30, 2010).
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+ gradual removal of restrictions on overflights over Russian
territory between Europe and Asia and complete elimina234
tion of all non-technical restrictions by 2013 at the latest.

Later in that year, at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki, the
parties did indeed initial an agreement entitled "Agreed Principles. ' 235 Nevertheless, while the agreement was adopted by the
Council in May 2007, the Russian Federation has not yet signed
it, "as it has linked its implementation with the need to first be
allowed to become a fully fledged WTO partner. Since then,
Member States6 efforts to address the issue with Russia bilaterally
23
have failed.
In view of the fact that the aforementioned restrictions stem
from the bilateral ASAs between Russia and the member states,
the Commission has initiated infringement proceedings under
Article 258 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) against almost the
totality of the member states 2 7 on the grounds that: 1) the nationality clauses infringe upon the freedom of establishment, as
declared by the Court in the open skies cases; 2) the obligatory
charges for Siberian overflights may violate international law,
since pursuant to Article 15 of the Chicago Convention "[n]o
234 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Siberia (Mar. 27, 2006).
235 See InternationalAviation: Russia, supra note 233.
236 Memorandum, European Comm'n, MEMO/11/167, supra note 225; International Aviation: Russia, supra note 233.
Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission
237 E.g.,
Launches Infringement Procedures Against Romania over Agreements with Russia on Equal Treatment of EU Airlines (IP/11/586) (May 19, 2011); Memorandum, European Comm'n, EU Law: Commission Acts to Ensure That European
Legislation Is Fully and Properly Implemented (MEMO/11/312) (May 19, 2011);
Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures Against Two Member States over Agreements with Russia
on Equal Treatment of EU Airlines and Siberian Flights (IP/11/424) (Apr. 6,
2011); Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches
Infringement Procedures Against Six Member States over Agreements with Russia on Equal Treatment of EU Airlines and Siberian Overflights (IP/11/298)
(Mar. 14, 2011); Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission
Launches Infringement Procedures Against Six Member States over Agreements
with Russia on Equal Treatment of EU Airlines and Siberian Overflights (IP/11/
186) (Feb. 16, 2011); Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures Against Seven Member States over
Agreements with Russia on Siberian Overflights (IP/11/74) (Jan. 27, 2011); Press
Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement
Procedures Against France, Germany, Austria, and Finland over Agreements with
Russia on Siberian Overflights (IP/10/1425 ) (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Press
Release, European Comm'n, IP/10/1425].

702

JOURNAL OF AIR LA W AND COMMERCE

fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting
State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or
exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or
persons or property thereon; '23" and 3) the obligation of EU
airlines to pay overflight charges directly to Aeroflot may infringe "EU antitrust law whereby airlines should not be forced
into concluding a commercial agreement with a direct
competitor. "239
The Commission's action against the member states raises a
number of issues. With regard to the nationality clauses, the issue appears to be what are a member state's obligations under
EU law when concluding, amending, or applying a bilateral ASA
with a third country when the latter refuses to recognize the acquis communautaire as construed by the Court in the open skies
cases. The matter becomes more interesting if one considers
that the European Commission has not been mandated by the
Council to negotiate an ASA with Russia on behalf of the member states, as is the case with the United States, but only to negotiate an agreement concerning the termination of Siberian
overflight charges.240 In practice, this means that air transport
operations between Russia and the member states may only occur on the basis of existing bilaterals. Were the member states
to denounce their bilateral agreements with Russia due to the
latter's reluctance to accept the replacement of the nationality
clauses with standard EU designation ones, air transportation
between the respective territories would be effectively disrupted.
It therefore appears that the member states are effectively between a rock and a hard place, as fulfillment of their obligations
under EU law amounts to violation of their obligations under
international law and vice versa. 24 1 Leaving aside the legal parameters of the issue, nevertheless, it could be argued that the
ultimate aim of the Commission's action against the member
states on these grounds is the retrieval of a mandate to negotiate
a multilateral ASA with Russia on behalf of the member states.
The same could not intuitively be said about the invocation by
the Commission of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.24 2 Article 92 thereof reserves adherence to the Convention to

240

Chicago Convention, supra note 11, art. 15.
See generally sources cited supra note 237.
See Press Release, Council of the European Union, supra note 234.

241

See, in this respect,

238
239

242

ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVEST-

EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAw (forthcoming 2011).
See Chicago Convention, supra note 11.
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"States, ' 243 with the EU enjoying simply observer participation in
the ICAO. 24 4 This practically means that the EU cannot possibly
demand the application of Article 15 but may only rely on the
individual member states' initiative to raise the issue with the
ICAO. While it seems that this is exactly what the Commission
was aiming at by invoking Article 15 of the Chicago Convention,
it is interesting to note that in 2002 the Commission proposed
to the EU Council of Ministers that it formally start negotiations
on Community membership in ICAO with a view to ensuring a
single EU representation.2 4 5 Arguably, given that the member
states have not yet taken any action on the recommendation, the
seen as an indirect but effective
Commission's action could24be
6
way to readdress the issue.
Last, but not least, the Commission is concerned that the obligation imposed on EU carriers to pay special royalties to Aeroflot may amount to infringement of EU antitrust law.24 7 In its
2005 communication on EU-Russia air transport relations, the
Commission clarified that the payments in question were "imposed by Russia in the bilateral agreements with Member States
through mandatory commercial agreements between EU airlines and Aeroflot. '' 21 8 Moreover, in a press release regarding
action against France, Germany, Austria, and Finland, the Commission stated that the bilaterals "between the four Member
States and Russia contain specific provisions.., on the modalities for fixing the charges that EU-designated carriers must pay
to Aeroflot. ''2 49 The Commission's concern in this respect appears to be twofold: in the first place, designated EU airlines are
de facto forced into concluding commercial agreements with a
direct competitor, something that, in the second place, "could
243 See id. art. 92(a) ("This Convention shall be open for adherence by members of the United Nations and States associated with them .... ").
244 See Recommendation from the Commission to the Council in Order to Authorize the
Commission to Open and Conduct Negotiations with the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on the Conditions and Arrangements for Accession by the European
Community, at 3, SEC (2002) 381 final (Apr. 9, 2002).
245 See id. at 1, 3; see also The European Community at ICAO, EUR. COMM'N: MOBILrrv & TRANSP. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/internationalaviation/european-community-icao/european-community-icao-en.htm, (last updated Oct.
31, 2010).
246 The European Community at ICAO, supra note 245.
247 Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/10/1425, supra note 237, at 2.
248 Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand the Council:
A Framework for Developing Relations with the Russian Federation in the Field of Air
Transport, at 3.2.2.1, COM (2005) 77 final (Mar. 14, 2005).
249 Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/10/1425, supra note 237, at 2.
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lead to competition distortions to the disadvantage of both EU
airlines and consumers."250 Although the Commission has not
yet explicitly stated in any of its press releases or other documentation which provisions of the treaty are being violated, it appears that there is room for Article 106(1) of the TFEU to apply,
in conjunction with Article 4(3) of the Treaty of the European
Union (TEU) and Article 101 of the TFEU.251
Following the drafting of this article, a number of important
and rather promising developments occurred in the field of EURussia aviation relations, briefly mentioned herein. The first important development comes from the field of bilateral air services agreements. Following the initiation of infringement
proceedings by the Commission against Finland over its bilateral
ASA with Russia in October 2010,252 Finland and Russia undertook, in December 2010, to commence negotiations with a view
to amend their bilateral concluded in 1993.253 A first meeting

was held in Helsinki on February 17-18, 2011, where the delegations of the aeronautical authorities agreed to a number of
amendments to the 1993 Protocol to bring it into conformity
with EU law, subject to approval by the respective governmerts.254 The next round of formal consultations was held in
Russia in June 2011. The consultations culminated in a 2011
Protocol amending the 1993 ASA, signed in Moscow on September 26, 2011, by the Finish and Russian Transport Ministers.255
The 2011 Protocol does away with the nationality principle,
setting as a standard of designation the criterion of establishment and the possession of a valid operating license and air operator certificate (all elements being regulated in accordance
with the law of the designating country).256

In addition, it

Id.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 101, 106, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 OJ. (C 115) 47, 88-90; Treaty of the
European Union art. 4(3), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. See also, in this
respect, Jost Luis BUENDIA SIERRE, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND STATE MONOPOLIES
UNDER EC LAw: ARTICLE 86 (FORMER ARTICLE 90) OF THE EC TREATY (1999).
252 Press Release, European Comm'n, IP/10/1425, supra note 237, at 1.
253 Press Release, Ministry of Transp. and Commc'ns, Amendment to Agreement Provides a New Basis for Air Services Between Finland and Russia (Sept. 27,
2011), available at http://www.lvm.fi/web/en/pressReleases/-/view/ 1272609.
250
251

254

Agreed Minutes,

FREIBURGER AUSBILDUNGSINSTITUT FOR VERHAITENSTHERAPIE

(Feb. 18, 2011), http://favt.ru/favt-new/
sites/default/files/Finland.pdf.
255 Press Release, Ministry of Transp. and Commc'ns, supra note 253.
256 See generally Pablo Mendes de Leon, Establishment of Air Transport Undertakings-Towards a More Holistic Approach, 15 J. AIR TRANsP. MGMT. 96 (2009).
GMBH AN DER UNIVERSITAT FREIBURG
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removes obligatory commercial agreements between airlines,
therefore resolving the issue of overflight payments to Aeroflot
and effectively preempting the Commission's infringement proceedings against Finland.
A further development worth mentioning (in which the aforementioned issues were discussed) is the realization of an EURussia aviation summit on October 12-13, 2011, in St. Petersburg. Session I of the Summit was dedicated to the "Policy
framework for the development of EU-Russia aviation relations
and the prospects of the EU-Russia aviation market. '25 7 In his

opening speech, Vice-President of the commission and Commissioner for Transport, Siim Kallas, congratulated Russia on its recent agreement with Finland, calling for the swift enshrinement
of the principle of EU designation into all bilateral agreements
Russia has concluded with EU member states.258 In its MEMO
of October 12, the Commission went a step further, stating that
"Russia has recently for the first time accepted the principle of
EU designation in its bilateral agreement with one EU Member
State and has agreed to use this 'pilot' agreement as a basis for
restoring legal certainty to all its bilateral ASAs with EU Member
States.

259

With regard to the issue of Siberian overflights, Vice-President
Kallas drew attention to the pending implementation of the
2006 agreement by Russia, rendering clear that: "'Agreed Principles' must enter into force no later than the date on which the
final decision on Russia's WTO accession is taken.

'2 60

A few

days later, on October 21, 2011, the EU's Trade Commissioner
announced the settlement of the last outstanding issues in EU257 Programme, EU-Russia Aviation Summit October 12-13, 2011, at the Hotel
Corinthia, St. Petersburg (October 12-13, 2011) available at http://ec.europa.
eu/transport/air/events/doc/eu-russia/programme.pdf.
258 Siim Kallas, Vice President & Comm'r, European Comm'n, Speech at the
EU-Russia Aviation Summit (Oct. 12, 2011) ("I congratulate Russia for its recent
agreement with Finland in which Russia for the first time accepts the principle of
EU designation. This principle must now be quickly enshrined into all other
bilateral agreements that Russia has with EU Member States: this is a pre-requisite for liberalizing air traffic between the EU and Russia. The Finland-Russia
agreement could probably serve as inspiration, but not necessarily as a model, for
these other agreements.").
259 Memorandum, European Comm'n, EU-Russia Aviation Summit: 12-13 October, 2011 (MEMO/11/695), at 1 (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum,
European Comm'n, MEMO/11/695].
260 Kallas, supra note 258; see also Memorandum, European Comm'n, MEMO/
11/695, supra note 259 ("Russia has confirmed that the agreement will be signed
and take effect before a decision is taken on Russia's accession to the WTO.").
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Russia relations before Russia's accession to the WTO: "We have
struck a deal on the final outstanding bilateral issues, leaving the1
way open for Russia to join the WTO by the end of this year. "26
Concerning the issue of Siberian overflights, "the EU has secured a guarantee from Russia that an agreement to amend the
payments ... will be implemented
system of Siberian overflight
26 2
in the coming weeks.
Despite the admittedly impressive developments in the field
of EU-Russia aviation relations at a political level, the reality on
the ground as experienced by the industry might be somewhat
different. Addressing the EU-Russia Summit of October 12-13,
Olivier Jankovec, Director General ACI Europe, commented:
"Not only has the Siberian over-flight issue not been resolved,
but red tape and unnecessary restrictions on aviation have actually increased in Russia. The latest example is the imposition of
border control measures at airports for crews of foreign aircraft-which are in breach of well-established ICAO standards. ' 26 3 It is hoped that the agreement that seems to have
been reached between Russia and Finland on simplified arrival
and departure procedures for crewmembers 26 4 will be generalized and extended to all bilateral between Russia and the EU
member states.

Press Release, European Comm'n, EU and Russia Agree Terms for Moscow's Eventual WTO Accession (IP/11/1231), at 1 (Oct. 21, 2011).
262 Id.; see also Memorandum, European Comm'n, Statement by President Barroso on the Conclusion of a Bilateral Agreement Between Georgia and Russia on
Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (MEMO/11/759),
at 1 (Nov. 3, 2011) ("The EU now looks forward to seeing Russia's WTO accession finalised with a view to reaching a consensus decision at the WTO Ministerial
Council meeting on 15-17 December in Geneva.").
263 See Report, EU-Russia Aviation Summit, AIR TRANSP. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2011),
http://www.airtransportnews.aero/print-analysis.pl?id=l 115.
7 ("Article 14 quarter, 1. Contracting par264 Agreed Minutes, supra note 254,
ties shall, in accordance with the Convention and legislation binding on each
Contracting Party, apply on mutual basis simplified procedures of arrival to and
departure from the territory of the Russian Federation and the territory of Finland accordingly for members of crewmembers of airlines of the Russian Federation and Finland providing agreed air services on the routes specified in the
[present Agreement] including non-regular flights .... 2. Similar procedure is
applied to those crew members participating in non-regular flights from (or in
direct of) international airports ....").
261
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III. A FLIGHT INTO THE FUTURE-EU-U.S. OPEN
AVIATION AREA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
FOR COMPETITION
A.

INTRODUCTION

The intensification of efforts to reach a final EU-U.S. ATA illustrates the parties' belief in the need to establish an OAA. In
fact, both the United States and the EU have either prepared or
commissioned studies primarily on the economic impacts and
effects of a transatlantic OAA. 265 All studies forecast far-reaching benefits for all air travelers, employees, and airlines.2 66 Although the credibility of these studies has been questioned on
the grounds, amongst other things, that they were prepared
before the financial crisis and, therefore, all financial projections and relevant quantifications produced fail to reflect current realities, 26 7 the economics of the OAA is the area attracting
the most interest and on which all seem to agree.
The recognition by the United States of all member states'
airlines as EU airlines has expanded the latter's market access
opportunities significantly, as they can now fly from any point in
Europe to the United States.2 6 8 Moreover, despite the maintenance of the O&C limitations, the possibility has opened up for
intra-European mergers, as there is no fear that traffic rights will
be lost due to the United States' refusal to approve the designa265 See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-835, TRANSATLANTIC
AVIATION: EFFECTS OF EASING RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.-EuRoPEAN MARKETIs (2004);
Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AN OPEN AVIATION AREA BETWEEN THE EU AND THE U.S. (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/

air portal/international/pillars/globalpartners/doc/us/eu us study-executive
_summary.pdf; BRATTLE GROUP, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-U.S. OPEN AVIATION AREA (2002), available at http://www.brattle.com/Publications/AlPublications.asp; CHPNE, supra note 217 (discussing the social implications of the
Agreement); DEEP INTEGRATION:

How TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS ARE LEADING

GLOBALIZATION (Daniel S. Hamilton & Joseph P. Quinlan eds., 2005), available at
http://www.ceps.eu / book/ deep-integration-how-transatlantic-markets-are-lead
ing-globalization.
266 See, e.g., Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 265, at iii (asserting that within
five years of its implementation, an OAA will bring about C12 billion in economic benefits; 72,000 new jobs; and 26 million additional passengers).
267 See Mark A. Glynn, Birds of a Feather: Network CarriersFlock Together in Early
Experiences of Transatlantic Open Skies, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 207, 232-34

(2009) (criticizing the 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton study).
268 For instance, following the 2007 ATA, Air France introduced stand-alone
services from Heathrow to Los Angeles, while British Airways' subsidiary "Open
Skies" started up operations from Paris to New York. See id. at 238-39.
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tion of the merged entity. 26 9 Of course, this only holds for
flights to the United States, as the likelihood still exists that
other third countries will continue to exercise their rights under
their bilaterals with the member states. 270 Although it is true
that the EU-U.S. market represents approximately sixty percent
of world traffic, the precedent of Russia provides an illustration
of the risks EU airlines assume when merging. 271 The same implication could arise in the event of mergers between EU and
U.S. airlines should a final agreement be reached.
This last point provides a first indication of how challenging a
final agreement is. This is so not only because it interferes with
the regulatory and operational identity of the aviation industry,
but mainly because it entrusts the parties with the duty to foresee possible implications and prospects. The analysis that follows aims at illustrating how important it is to fully comprehend
what the agreement at issue entails. Thereafter, the ground
could be prepared so that the dangers can be effectively prevented and the prospects adequately exploited. The main angle
from which the issue will be approached is that of competition
law.
B.

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

1.

The Consumer Experience

a.

Prospects

Arguably, at the core of each competition-law analysis is and
should be the consumer. Air travelers being the consumers of
air transport services, it should first be considered what the im269 See ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 6. Since the 2007 ATA, the Commission approved the acquisition of BMI by Lufthansa, see Information from European Union Institution and Bodies: Non-Opposition to a Notified Concentration
Case COMP/M.5403, 2009 OJ. (C 158) 1, 1, the merger between Lufthansa and
SNAH (Brussels Airlines), see Summary of Commission Decision Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and EEA Agreement Case
COMP/M.5335, 2009 OJ. (L 295) 11, 13, the merger between Lufthansa and
Austrian Airlines, see Summary of Commission Decision Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and EEA Agreement Case COMP/
M.5440, 2010 O.J. (C 16) 11, 16, and the merger between British Airways and
Iberia, see Information from European Union Institution, Bodies, Offices, and
Agencies: Non-Opposition to a Notified Concentration Case COMP/M.5756,
2010 OJ. (C 241) 1, 1.
270 See ATA Protocol, supra note 202, annex 6.
271 Press Release, European Parliament, Safeguards for Workers and Environment as Transatlantic Aviation Market Opens Up (May 24, 2011); Memorandum,
European Comm'n, MEMO/11/167, supra note 225.
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pact of a final agreement will be on them. Given that each prospect comes together with a challenge and vice versa, both ends
of the spectrum should be considered simultaneously. The immediate effect of expanded market access opportunities is the
introduction of new services or increased frequencies of already
existing services. 272 Market entry is expected to fuel competi-

tion and lead to better quality services and lower prices. 273 Inno-

vation is a key word in this respect, as the new business reality
might lead to the development of new business models, beyond
of hub-and-spoke or network carriers
the already existing ones
2 74
carriers.
low-cost
and
The anticipated consolidation and rationalization of the
transatlantic market through mergers and acquisitions is meant
to bring about efficiencies, which will eventually be passed on to
consumers. 275 Integration of operations is expected to unleash
the value that exists in increased network scale. 276 Mergers between airlines with complementary networks are expected to increase connectivity. 277 This is translated into more destinations
served, but also into the provision of seamless and most likely
direct service, as opposed to connecting service, by a single carrier. Mergers between airlines with overlapping networks are
expected to lead to network rationalization. 27 This translates
into better aircraft utilization and thus to lower fares and a more
pleasant travel experience for consumers. 279 The rationalization
of overlapping networks might in turn lead to network expansion, as the released capacity (i.e., aircraft and slots) could be
used to penetrate new markets. Moreover, integration of operations is going to unleash the value that exists in enhanced market impact. The greater breadth of service brought about
272 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Airline Mergers and Alli-

ances, at 8, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 1 (Jan. 26, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/1 / 15/2379233.pdf.
273 See Glynn, supra note 267, at 230.
274 Id. Soon after the conclusion of the 2007 ATA, Ryanair announced its intention to enter the transatlantic market, modifying its business model so as to
offer both premium services and low-cost services. See id.
275 See Dorothy Robyn, James Rfitzes & Boaz Moselle, Beyond Open Skies: The
Economic Impact of a U.S.-EU Open Aviation Area, in DEEP INTEGRATION: How TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS ARE LEADING GLOBALIZATION 50, 62 (Daniel S. Hamilton &

Joseph P. Quinlan eds., 2005).
276 See id. at 59.
277 See id.
278 See id.

279 This is so, as more comfortable, wide-bodied aircraft will replace the existing ones.
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following an airline merger is of utmost interest to corporate
clients, as are the merged airlines' combined frequent flyer programs (FFPs). Consumers could further avail themselves of the
new entity's enhanced distribution reach.28 °
b.

Challenges
To the extent that consolidation and concentration are inextricable, challenges to consumer welfare could not be excluded.
Past experience in the U.S. air transport market following deregulation provides an illustration of what consumers might be
faced with should a final agreement come into force. The liberalization of the market following the promulgation of the 1978
Airline Deregulation Act led to a merger wave that literally swept
the industry, leaving it with some six mega-carriers (the so-called
"big six") .28' Although the consolidation achieved was initially
seen as positive, as it effectively dispensed with the overcapacity
that plagued the industry, it soon proved pernicious to competition and consumer welfare.28 2 The big six, enjoying considerable market shares and, therefore, respective market power,
engaged in relentless predation, condemning almost to failure
any attempt to enter the market. 2 3 The predatory practices of
dominant U.S. airlines (which, paradoxically, found their best
ally in the U.S. judiciary, the latter being influenced by Chicago
theorists) lasted for decades, leading in 2001 to a seminal report
by the DOT entitled "Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair
Ex24
clusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry.
The likelihood that the same scenario could be replicated in
the transatlantic market, even with magnified negative results
given the latter's greater size, cannot be excluded. The elimination of the O&C limitations could result in U.S. giants (of American Airlines' and United Airlines' size) merging with European
mega-carriers (like Air France-KLM) to create mammoth airlines. The emergence of such transnational, if not transcontiSee Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, AIRLINE MERGER INTEGRATION: TAKE OFF CHECK3 (2001), availableat http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/AirlineMerger
_Integration.pdf.
281 See Rodney E. Slater, How Antitrust Failed in America: The Sad Case of Predatory
Pricingin the U.S. Airline Industry, 32 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1, 84 (2003).
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See Charles E. Mueller, Foreword:Beginning of the End of Monopoly in the U.S.
Airline Industry?, 33 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 1, 2-3, 10-11 (2006); see also U.S.
DOT, Docket No. OST-98-3713, ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY (Jan. 17, 2001).
280
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nental, undertakings itself could arguably prevent new entry or
even induce exit. If, in addition, these undertakings were to engage in predatory or other anti-competitive conduct, the outcome would be harmful to all stakeholders. Going a step
further, as a merging initiative of that type could not but coerce
other airlines to join forces, the possibility of eventually being
left with a highly concentrated market is huge. That obviously
entails the disappearance of several hundred airlines, ranging
from the traditional national flag carriers to regional and other
feeder carriers, as a process mainly of either hostile acquisitions
or bankruptcies. The immediate elimination of choice entailed
might deprive consumers of the service currently enjoyed. Although, for instance, as things stand, the combination of the
hub-and-spoke model with that of point-to-point service provides a guarantee that all destinations are being served, the disappearance of smaller airlines, which currently connect
secondary markets to big hubs and provide feeder traffic, could
amount to services in these markets being reduced or even disrupted. This is so as the design of the merged entities' network,
the choice of the destinations served, and the frequencies offered will necessarily be made on the basis of criteria so far
pretty much unknown. The likelihood of arbitrariness in this
respect remains open. What is more, quality of service may also
be affected, further degrading the air travel experience.
The concentration described could distort competition further in the event the very few airlines dominating the market
decide to collude. If such collusion also takes place within the
context of airline alliances (leading to a global cartel), consumers are only left with the competition authorities' ability to prevent such an action or swiftly intervene in an effective way. The
repercussions of such a cartelization cannot but have a global
dimension, threatening consumer welfare everywhere on the
globe. Last, but not least, one could further wonder whether, in
the event a merged entity simply fails, it would ever be left to
fail. Keeping in mind the economic, social, and also political
interests at stake, the temptation for the U.S. government and
the EU to bail out the company could result in the granting of
immense subsidies out of tax payers' monies. The consumer
harm in this case appears magnified, as it relates to both the
inefficiency of the airline and the subsidies themselves.
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2.

The Airline Industry Experience

a.

Prospects

The liberalization of the transatlantic air transport market is
expected to have a huge impact on the identity of the aviation
industry. Airlines are already exploiting enhanced market access opportunities by increasing their services, while also operating from outside their home country. The abolition of cabotage
limitations, should a final agreement be reached, will offer airlines great operational flexibility, as they will be entitled to full
entry into each other's market. For EU airlines in particular,
the lifting of wet-leasing restrictions in the United States, as well
as their full participation in the Fly America Program, will put
them on an equal competitive footing with their U.S.
counterparts.
Obviously, the area where the greatest efficiencies and cost
synergies could be exploited is that of mergers. The extremely
high operating costs of the airline industry render the need for
synergies imperative. Network rationalization on the basis of
the merging parties' combined passenger volume may only lead
to efficiencies, translated into profits for the airlines. This can
happen in manifold ways. By exiting thin routes (i.e., routes
with insufficient demand to justify service), airlines could take
advantage of the released capacity to either introduce new services to profitable destinations, or to lease, sell, or otherwise
commercially exploit the relevant assets. Where demand justifies it, airlines could consider whether they could benefit by
economies of airline densities. In the case of overlapping networks, airlines could reduce service by using bigger aircraft.
Thus, it might be that a destination that before the merger used
to be served by both parties can now be served by the merged
entity on a reduced scale in terms of frequency, thanks to the
use of bigger aircraft-the passenger volume always being the
same. The assets freed in this way could again be commercially
exploited in a variety of ways. In the case of network complementarities, the demand for the network as a whole increases as
a corollary to the additional destinations served. Except for efficiencies that can be gained from a certain rationalization
therein, the provision of seamless services leaves room for further gains. Evidently, significant value could be unleashed in a
number of subsidiary areas. For instance, the pooled negotiating leverage of the merged entity could lead to significant cost
savings in the area of procurement, especially airline and fuel
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procurement. Manpower rationalization, facility consolidation,
and balance sheet restructuring are all areas of potential cost
synergies.285
b.

Challenges

The immediate effect on the industry of a process of consolidation cannot be other than the disappearance of smaller carriers as a result of bankruptcies, voluntary exits, acquisitions, takeovers, or mergers. The elimination of market participants might
lead to elimination of competition and finally to collusion. This
outcome will deprive the industry of any motive to innovate and
improve its products and services, something that, in turn,
might result in losses of market shares. Especially in Europe,
where high-speed rail is quite developed, the likelihood that
consumers switch from air transport to rail transport, especially
on short-haul routes, should not be underestimated.
Moving away from the worst-case scenario just described and
looking specifically into mergers between U.S. and European
airlines, making such a transaction a success is arguably already
a challenge. If one considers that the majority of ordinary mergers fail in their implementation,2 86 the undertaking of turning a
transaction unprecedented in all respects into a success appears
to be a herculean task. The risks involved are obviously enormous, as are the hurdles that need to be overcome. While both
the EU and U.S. air transport markets are mature, they present
large differences. Swift adaptation within an open aviation area,
a prerequisite for the merger's success, appears dependent
upon accurate business estimations that need to be carried out
ex ante or at least in time to allow for effective implementation. 28 7 As the experience of intra-European cross-border mergFor a comprehensive analysis of airline mergers, see OECD, supra note 272.
See Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 265, at 1.
287 See Jean-Cyrill Spinetta, Chairman, Air Fr.-KLM Grp., Speech at the Nyenrode European Business Forum: The AIR FRANCE KLM Story (Feb. 23, 2006),
available at http://corporate.airfrance.com/uploads/media/Speech-by_JC
Spinetta Nyenrode European BusinessForum.pdf. See, in this respect, the Air
France-KLM experience, as described by the companies' CEOs at Nyenrode Business Universiteit on February 23, 2006. Two's Company (on file with author).
Commenting on the idea that the enterprise of cross-border mergers is like building a bridge as you walk across it ("the direction might seem clear, but you have
to deal with obstacles as you encounter them"), KLM's former CEO confessed
that "walking on a bridge as you build it is indeed an interesting experience. We
had a shared vision and many ideas, otherwise we didn't have a clue. It was very
inspiring and, of course, nothing beats success." Id.
285

286
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ers and acquisitions (M&As) indicates, besides the economics of
the transaction that have to work out, there is also a range of
additional factors that need to be addressed related to cultural
and language issues, as well as to emotional and political parameters. 2 8 As these hurdles are part and parcel of any EU-U.S.
transaction of that type, the challenge inherent in the whole
idea of consolidation is even greater.
The current financial crisis accentuates another reality: the industry's exposure to numerous destabilizing factors historically
appearing around the world. Wars, terrorist attacks, recessions,
oil crises, and even epidemics severely affect the profitability of
the industry, either by increasing its operating costs (for example, in the case of high fuel prices or increased security measures) or by reducing its proceeds due to decreased demand for
air transport services (such as following terrorist attacks,
epidemics, wars, financial crises, etc.) .8° Arguably, the current
structure of the industry provides a certain protection against
similar occurrences. The national or regional character of the
majority of airlines eliminates the impact of calamities striking
in different parts of the world. The operational equilibrium
that has been achieved in terms of business models (e.g., huband-spoke, point-to-point, etc.) and methods (such as interlining, code-sharing, sharing of FFPs, participation in computer
reservation systems (CRSs), etc.) 2 ° effectively addresses the risks
inherent in the global character of the industry. The creation of
open aviation areas and the emergence of global airlines will
automatically lift that protection. Designing the different business models and methods that this process necessitates in such a
way as to minimize the negative effects of global operations,
while at the same time maximizing the respective positive effects, is an enterprise in itself.

288

Spinetta, supra note 287.

See, e.g., id. (discussing the effect of steep oil prices on airlines); Dep't of Air
Transp. at Cransfield Univ., Changes in Demand for Air Travel, AiRPORT INT'L,
http://www.airport-int.com/article/changes-in-demand-for-air-travel.html
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2011) (discussing decreases in demand resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks, SARS, and the Iraq war).
290 See European Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Transp. [EC/DOT], Translatlantic
Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and Regulatory Approaches at 1, 4 (Nov. 16, 2010),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/jointalliance report.pdf.
289
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The Competition Law Experience

As already mentioned, although the economics of the Protocol have been considered (both the United States and the EU
having prepared or commissioned relevant studies) no similar
efforts have been made with regard to the legal implications of
the Protocol. This is striking, given that the need for regulatory
convergence has been, at least implicitly, recognized. 291

Al-

though it is true that the Protocol provides explicitly for regulatory cooperation, taking mainly the form of inter-agency
exchanges, it could be inferred both from the frequency with
which mention is made therein of the need for extensive regulatory cooperation and from the wording itself that regulatory
convergence is indispensable. As the latter outcome is neither
easy toachieve nor unproblematic, the final part of the analysis
will focus on the prospects and challenges associated with the
implementation of the Protocol, examining the matter always
from the perspective of competition law.
a.

Prospects

If one considers the differences between the U.S. legal system
and the EU legal system, speaking about regulatory convergence
(let alone regulatory harmonization) might seem like joining
the two sides of the Atlantic together. As air transport, since its
very existence, has been doing exactly that, it might well be that
it will become, once again, the vehicle bridging the gap between
the EU and the U.S. legal systems.
Considering the prospects that open up for competition law
from the implementation of the Protocol, in essence, answers
the question: "Why is there a need for regulatory convergence?"
The answer is obvibusly related to the necessity of safeguarding
fair competition for all market participants. Air transport being
by nature the international mode of transport par excellence, it
can only operate efficiently if it is governed by global rules.
Since the majority of airlines operate international networks,
the potential for distortion of competition due to the lack of a
291 See ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 5(3) ("conflicting regulatory requirements"); Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, arts. 9(7), 17; see alsoATA Protocol, supra note 202, arts. 2, 5(4) (e) ("reciprocal recognition of regulatory
determinations"); ATA Protocol, supra note 202, art. 5(4) (j) ("exchanges on new
legislative or regulatory initiatives and developments"); ATA Protocol, supra note
202, art. 5(4) (c) ("maintaining an inventory of issues regarding government
subsidies").

716

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE

uniform system of rules is significant. The creation of an OAA,
predicated on common rules, will exacerbate the need for alignment of U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law.
To achieve the ultimate goal of a level playing field, a number
of practical needs should be met. As already mentioned in Part
II.D, the implications linked with cross-border mergers have led
to the formation of airline alliances. An alliance is a commercial
cooperation agreement, which, though not leading to legal and
financial integration the way a merger does, depending on its
intensity and scope, might lead to far-reaching operational integration that resembles a merger.29 2 Although today there are
thousands of alliance agreements worldwide, there is a clear
trend toward the formation of global alliances. 29s As the level of
cooperation between the members of an alliance is often high,
the potential of alliance agreements to distort competition renders scrutiny under competition law indispensable.
The latter aspect (scrutiny) would not be problematic if there
were just a single authority in charge, applying uniform rules
across the board. Nevertheless, to the extent that approval or
clearance of the same transaction is the task of several authorities, each one of them applying different rules, things in practice tend to be rather complicated. Thus, while in the United
States the authority in charge of approving an alliance and
granting antitrust immunity (the latter being the equivalent of
an exemption, as provided for in Article 101 (3) TFEU) is the
DOT,2 9 4 in Europe, as of May 1, 2004, following the advent of
Regulation 1/2003295 and Regulation 411/2004,296 it is the alli-

ance parties' own responsibility to safeguard compliance with
Article 101 TFEU. The new arrangement renders not only the
Commission, but also the National Competition Authorities
292 See EC/DOT, supra note 290,
16-21. In fact, there have been alliances,
which have been seen as full function joint ventures (FFJVs) within the meaning
of Article 3(4) of the Commission Merger Regulation 139/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 24)
1, and treated accordingly. See, e.g., Regulation (ECC) No 4064/89, Merger Procedure, Case No COMP/JV.19, at 3.2 (Nov. 8, 1999) (approving the 1999 alliance
between Alitalia and KLM and classifying it as a FFJV).
293 See EC/DOT, supra note 290, at 6, tbl.1 (displaying the historical development of airline alliances).
294 EC/DOT, supra note 290, 1 51.
295 Council Regulation 1/2003, on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC).
296 Council Regulation 411/2004, Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87
and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 3976/87 and (EC) No 1/2003, in Connection with Air Transport Between the Community and Third Countries, 2004 OJ.
(L 68) 1 (EC).
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(NCAs) and national courts competent to scrutinize alliance
agreements in light of Article 101 TFEU. Since transatlantic alliances are treated by the DOT as virtual mergers (as if they were
a single carrier and the effects would be equivalent to a
merger), application for approval and antitrust immunity is obligatory. 29" The involvement of the U.S. authorities will most
likely entail the involvement of the European Commission and
probably of the respective NCAs. So far, the harm for the parties seems to lie in the administrative burden of having to communicate and cooperate with a number of authorities located in
different places and at different times, as not all investigations
commence simultaneously. Arguably, the real problems begin
when the authorities engage in their scrutiny of the transaction.
The DOT pursues a two-step analysis.298 In the first instance,
it determines whether the alliance merits approval. This is so if:
+ it is not adverse to the public interest; and
+ in the event it substantially reduces or eliminates
competition,
a. it is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or
to secure important public benefits; and
b. the benefits thereof cannot be secured by reasonably
available alternative means having materially less anticompetitive effects.

299

Thereafter, if the agreement is approved, the authority examines whether immunity from antitrust laws should be granted. 00
This is so when:
+ the parties would not otherwise proceed with the agreement; and
+ the grant of ATI is required by the public interest. 01
The DOT's statutory obligation to consider the public interest
in its antitrust law analysis stems from its authority as "a general
3'' 0 2
regulator and policy maker in the U.S. transport industry.
The same could not be said about the EU system, whereby, while
the Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) is entrusted with the enforcement of EU competition law, the general transport policy lies with the Directorate General for
See EC/DOT, supra note 290,
Id. 52.
Id.

Id.

53.

Id.
Id.

69.

26, 51.
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Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) ." This division of competences entails that DG COMP, when reviewing the airline cooperation agreements, is only entitled to apply the legal tests
provided for by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (i.e., the potential of
consumer welfare being harmed).4

Although U.S. antitrust

and EU competition law are generally inspired by similar principles and pursue similar goals, the different scope of the authorities' review is in itself sufficient to differentiate the outcomes of
the competition law analysis significantly. This reality exposes
the parties to an alliance agreement not only to legal uncertainty, but often to conflicting legal obligations stemming from
contradictory decisions (e.g., conflicting remedies).
In the absence of regulatory convergence, the situation just
described will be replicated in the field of merger control
should a final agreement come into force. Arguably, given that
a merger amounts to legal, financial, and operational integration, as opposed to alliance agreements, which constitute looser
forms of commercial cooperation, the likelihood of regulatory
divergence dissuading airlines from merging is not negligible.
Although EU-U.S. inter-agency cooperation is not a new concept if one considers that the ATA between the EU and the
United States regarding the application of their competition
laws dates back to 1991,305 regulatory convergence remains a

theoretical concept. The proliferation of relevant documents
on inter-agency cooperation recently experienced," 6 however
significant, falls short of providing the market with the clarity
303

Id.

304

Id.

70.

E.g., Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government
of the United States of America Regarding the Application of their Competition
Laws, U.S.-European Communities, Apr. 27, 1995, 1995 0.J. (L 95) 45; Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United
States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June 18, 1998, 1998 0.J. (L 173) 28.
306 See, e.g., US-EU Merger Working Grp., Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger
Investigations (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/eu us.pdf; Int'l Competition Network, Waivers of Confidentiality in Merger
Investigations (2011), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/uploads/library/doc330.pdf; European Competition Auths. (ECA), The Exchange of InformationBetween Members on MultijurisdictionalMergers (2011), available
at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/ECA/ECA-procedures-guide-postAthens.pdf; see also Merger Working Grp., Draft/Best Practices
on CooperationBetween EU National Competition Authorities in Merger Review (2011),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011-merger-best_
practices/en.pdf.
305
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necessary for cross-border transactions of a certain magnitude to
occur. Although the successful implementation of the final
agreement is dependent upon consistent and coherent rules,
the practical needs behind its adoption could be seen as, and
finally constitute, a lever of pressure, leading to regulatory
convergence.
The benefits associated with alignment of EU and U.S. legislation are manifold. On the practical side, the immediate outcome of this process is a more efficient use of resources on
behalf of both the parties to an agreement and the reviewing
authorities. Convergence of procedural rules could dispense
with the current multiplication of costs due to multiple notifications to several authorities. Dealing with a single authority will
release human and material resources to be allocated in a more
efficient way.
At the same time, the involvement of a single authority will
speed up the decision-making process considerably, and by the
same token, the implementation of the cooperation agreement.
This is so since the current need for extensive cooperation between, on the one hand, the parties and the various authorities
and, on the other hand, the authorities themselves, will not exist
anymore. Equally, delays due to the parties' stand-still obligations (until the various authorities adopt their respective decisions) will be avoided.
On the substantive side, the elimination of red tape will enhance legal certainty. The rationalization of the review process
will act as a catalyst to transactions, offering to the market the
necessary guarantees to operate properly. The avoidance of
conflicting decisions creating conflicting legal obligations will
bolster the credibility of the legal system, encouraging compliance and naturally leading to a level playing field. At the enforcement level, the danger of extraterritorial application of
national competition laws that currently exists will diminish. 7
The said danger arises in instances where, in the absence of an
international framework of competition rules, the extraterritorial application of national competition laws is deemed necessary to patch up loopholes emerging from the territorial reach
307 At the Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference organized by the ICAO,
states were urged to be careful when applying national competition law to international air transport so as to avoid unilateral action. See ICAO, ConsolidatedConclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendations and Declaration, at 2.3, ICAO Doc.
ATConf/5 (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/meetings/2003/atconf5/docs/ATConf5_conclusions en.pdf.
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of national jurisdiction. 0 8 According to the "effects doctrine"
developed in U.S. law, commercial conduct carried out overseas
but intended or calculated to affect the United States is subject
to U.S. antitrust laws.3 09 Equally, according to the "place of implementation" test developed in EU law, 10 the jurisdiction of
the Union in competition matters is determined by the place
where the anti-competitive arrangements take effect.
The application of national competition laws to transnational
conduct, albeit reasonable, might interfere with the efficiency,
regularity, and viability of international air transport. In fact,
the Fifth ICAO Worldwide Air Transport Conference urged
states to take into account, when applying antitrust or competition laws to such arrangements, the need for inter-carrier cooperation, including interlining, to continue when it benefits users
and air carriers. 11 It is clear that the convergence of U.S. antitrust and EU competition law will eliminate legal uncertainty as
to types of commercial conduct that could trigger the extraterritorial application of national laws. Moreover, it will enhance legal efficiency by facilitating enforcement and dispensing with
existing difficulties to establish forum and jurisdiction.312
An area of law whose evolution the adoption of a final agreement could help enormously is that of state aid. The EU is the
only trading block in the world that has a state aid regime.313
Articles 107-109 TFEU have played a very important role in the
maintenance of a level playing field within the EU and have provided the legal basis for the adoption of air transport-specific
rules on illegal state aid. 314 The Commission's contribution to
308 See Roger P. Afford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1992).
309 Id. at 8-9.
310 SeeJoined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/
85, C-126/85, C-127/85, C-128/85, & C-129/85, Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v.
139-43.
Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1307,
31 See ICAO, supra note 307.
312 For a discussion on extraterritoriality, see Abeyratne, supra note 72, at
58-62.
3 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Martin Goyette, The Interface Between EU State
Aid Control and the WFO Disciplines on Subsidies, 4 EUR. ST. AID. L.Q. 695, 695
(2006).
314 Michael Blauberger & Rike U. Krdmer, European Competition vs. Global Competitiveness: Transferring EU Rules on State Aid and Public Procurement Beyond Europe
8-9 (Ctr. for Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 10-10, 2010), available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/15502/BlaubergerKramer_
2010_CCP%20EU%2ORule%20Transfer.pdf?sequence=4.
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the enforcement of these rules has been great. 15 The United
States, on the other hand, lacks a comprehensive set of rules on
state aid, relying on WTO provisions on subsidies.3 1 6 This may
be explained by the fact that while in Europe subsidies to airlines are granted by the individual member states, in the United
States, it is the federal state itself that subsidizes U.S. airlines
rather than the individual states. This means, in practice, that
while in the case of the EU, its supranational dimension absolutely justifies the existence of a state aid regime, in the case of
the United States, if any legislation on subsidies' control were to
be promulgated, its addressee would necessarily be the federal
state, which would be restricted in its industrial policy as a result.
This discrepancy has resulted in a situation whereby EU member states are obliged to abide by a tight regulatory framework
in all their dealings with airlines, whereas the U.S. government
is bound by no rules whatsoever, save for WTO rules, which are
loose and often unenforceable." 7
Leaving aside the harm this reality has caused the European
aviation industry31 8 (if not the American aviation industry
also) ,319 Article 14 of the EU-U.S. ATA on Government Subsidies
and Support opens the door to the evolution of state aid law.3 20
Regulatory cooperation, as provided for in the ATA and Protocol, could eventually lead to the adoption by the United States
of a comprehensive system of rules on subsidies alongside the
EU state aid regime. In fact, the latter could constitute a source
of inspiration in this respect, given its degree of development
Id. at 8.
FinancialSupport for Car Manufacturers:An Overview of Relevant WTO and EU
Law Rules, HERBERT SMITH, http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/AEBE
3398-A735-4161-8C55-61 C7CD8E9751/9140/Financialsupportforcarmanufacturersanoverviewofrel.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter FinancialSupport]; see also Vassilis Akritidis, Jochen P. Beck, Riccardo Croce & Yves Melin, EU
Substantive Areas: Trade, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., http://www.globalcompeti(last visited
tionreview.com/reviews/28/sections/98/chapters/ 1090/trade/
Sept. 27, 2011); Ehlermann & Goyette, supra note 313.
317 See FinancialSupport, supra note 316.
318 See Council Regulation 868/2004, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 Concerning Protection Against Subsidation and Unfair
Pricing Practices Causing Injury to Community Air Carriers in the Supply of Air
Services from Countries not Members of the European Community, 2004 OJ. (L
162) 1 (EC).
319 See Christopher McBay, Comment, Airline Deregulation Deserves Another Shot:
How ForeignInvestment Restrictions and Subsidies Actually Hurt the Airline Industry, 72
J. AIR L. & CoM. 173, 173 (2007).
320 See Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 14; ATA Protocol, supra
315

316

note 202, art. 5(4) (c).
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and sophistication. As state aid law constitutes an integral part
of EU competition law, its transposition into U.S. antitrust law
would further assist the evolution of the latter.
The process of regulatory convergence may, if properly conducted, lead to a better legal system. The interaction between
U.S. antitrust and EU competition law may not only assist the
understanding of each legal system, but also lead to an outcome
whereby the strengths of one legal system remedy the weaknesses of the other. These exchanges could finally result in the
fusion of the two, and thus in the emergence of a single, streamlined, and more just system of rules. To the extent that a global
industry, like air transport, is in need of global rules to maximize its efficiency, the harmonization of U.S. antitrust and EU
competition law, due to the creation of a transatlantic open aviation area, could lay the foundations for similar action being pursued in other fields of law and other parts of the world.
b.

Challenges

Arguably, if the prospects the implementation of the ATA and
Protocol brings about for competition law are great, the challenges that need to be met in practice are even greater. At this
stage, the challenge appears to lie in foreseeing the negative implications thereof in order to effectively prevent them. As both
the prediction of dangers and the laying down of safeguards to
preempt them require extensive knowledge of both legal systems, it is suggested that investing time and energy in this task is
crucial.
Probably an orthodox way to commence the analysis would be
by first examining whether the sector of air transport could benefit by past experience gained in other sectors of the economy,
which, at a certain stage of their evolution, were faced with similar challenges.3 2 1 Although the aviation industry is not the only

global industry that exists (especially in an increasingly globalized economy), the way it has been regulated historically is distinct.122 This may imply that challenges that have manifested
themselves in different contexts of liberalization may not be rel321 For an account of telecommunications liberalization, see Marco Bronckers
& Pierre Larouche, A Review of the WVTO Regime for Telecommunications Services, in
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES 319, 319-79 (Kern
Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., 2008).
322 See Khalil Ahmad & Mukhtar M. Kahn, A ComparativeAnalysis of Productivity
of Airline Industry: Evidence from Selected Asian Airlines, 15 INT'LJ. Bus. & Soc. Scl.
224, 224-25 (2011).
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evant. By contrast, valuable experience could be obtained from
challenges that have already manifested themselves in the aviation industry itself.
As transatlantic airline mergers have not yet materialized,
the
example of transatlantic alliances could be considered. Although both the DOT and the Commission treat alliances as virtual mergers,3 2 3 their competition analysis varies considerably.
Starting from the definition of the relevant market, while the
Commission has mainly focused on city pairs (point of originpoint of destination), the DOT has also considered the airlines'
network as a whole.3 24 The Commission's focus on the effects of
an alliance on city pairs has been justified on the grounds that
in the passenger air transportation market, widespread demandside substitution does not exist:
If confronted with high prices due to a monopoly on a particular
O & D [ (origin and destination) ] pair, a passenger may find little
comfort in the fact that airlines compete world-wide in the development of their respective networks. ... The Commission therefore maintains that consumers wishing to travel from a point of
origin to a specific point of destination will consider the various
possibilities to travel to the point of destination. Hence, consumers will take into account the network aspects such as for example frequent flyer programs only to the extent that airlines or
alliances serve the O&D pair between which they wish to
travel.325

In other words, "[i] f the price of travel in City-Pair A increases,
consumers would not generally consider substituting travel in
City-Pair B."'3 26 By contrast, the U.S. DOT has factored in its
analysis (except for the effect of the alliance at a city-pair and
country-pair level) its effect at a network level, air transport being a network industry.3 2 7 The shift in focus places at the center
of the DOT's attention not the air travelers, but the airlines
themselves: "Carriers make decisions relating to an individual
city-pair by assessing not only the O&D market but also implications for their overall networks. For example, a carrier may
323 Albeit assessed under the antitrust provisions of the TFEU, rather than
under the Merger Regulation, alliances have been considered by the Commission
to have the same competitive effects as mergers. See EC/DOT, supra note 290, at

7-8.

Id. at 20-21.
Commission Decision of 11 February 2004 in Case COMP/M.3280, supra
11-12.
note 180,
78.
326 EC/DOT, supra note 290,
324
325

327

Id.

79.
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choose to enter an unprofitable route if that route would provide important feeder traffic to other routes within its network. '328 The last statement is best understood if the business

model of the allied airlines is taken into account (i.e., the huband-spoke model) .9

Moving on to the issue of antitrust immunity/exemption from
competition laws and relevant conditions thereof, further differences in approaches can be easily detected. Generally, the Commission tends to be very accommodating concerning whether an
alliance agreement should be considered for clearance or rejected outright, but very strict concerning the conditions to be
fulfilled by the parties. The DOT, on the other hand, appears to
espouse the opposite approach: while it would not hesitate to
reject an alliance agreement outright, if considered manifestly
anti-competitive, it tends to be more relaxed concerning the
conditions to be fulfilled. Thus, although the Commission has
considered for clearance and finally cleared upon onerous conditions agreements between airlines with overlapping networks,'3

0

the DOT sees value in complementarities.

31

This is

comprehensible in view of the DOT's focus on the airlines' network when defining the relevant market. The Commission's
analysis appears equally coherent: its consideration of overlapping routes as liable for exemption upon conditions is consistent with its focus on city-pairs when defining the relevant
market.3 32 Nevertheless, the different rationale underpinning
each analysis is clear: as it has been commented,333 the DOT is
reluctant to interfere with the transaction's business rationale
through the imposition of conditions, therefore considering
that to be the parties' responsibility. The Commission, on the
other hand, is more interventionist, imposing stringent conditions meant to ensure that competition will not be distorted.
Id.
329 So far, there have been no alliances between low cost carriers (point-topoint service). See id. 36.
330 See Commission Decision, of 5 July 2002 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant
to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in Case
COMP/37.730-AUA/LH, 2002 O.J. (L 242) 25 [hereinafter Commission Decision in Case COMP/37.730].
331 Specifically on this matter, see Geert Goeteyn, Issues Raised by the U.S. Department of Transportation'sDecision in the Skyteam Case: A ComparativeAnalysis, 31 AmR &
SPACE L. 291 (2006).
332 See Commission Decision in Case COMP/37.730, supra note 330, at 29.
333 Goeteyn, supra note 331.
328
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Looking more specifically into remedies imposed by the authorities or commitments given by the parties, it is not striking
that the most popular of the Commission's remedies (i.e., divestment of slots) is the least cherished on the other side of the
Atlantic, while the most popular of the DOT's remedies (i.e.,
carve-outs) is unknown in Europe. Obliging parties to release
slots to competitors is the Commission's preferred way to engineer new entry. 334 Given that slots at hub airports are scarce,
partly due to the network carriers' business model (hub-andspoke) and partly due to the slot allocation system in Europe
(grandfathering rights), new entry is difficult. A way to demolish that barrier, fueling competition on problematic routes, is by
asking parties to divest slots. Yet, depriving parties of their assets
to protect competition is perceived in the United States as too
onerous a remedy to impose. 35 Instead, the DOT has opted for
a solution whereby the parties are prohibited from jointly setting fares on markets (mainly hub-to-hub routes) where competition might be affected.336 Although both slot divestments and
carve-outs have been criticized for their efficiency (each one for
different reasons), they are illustrative of the authorities' perception as to how far they could and should go when exercising
their enforcement power.
The aforementioned examples of how divergent the U.S. and
the EU views might be on the same matters could be easily multiplied if discrepancies between general U.S. antitrust and EU
competition law are considered. The notion of market dominance in the respective jurisdiction is just a little example
thereof. Given that a sector-specific competition law analysis,
based on sectoral rules, is always conducted within the wider
context of general competition law, when contemplating align334 European Competition Authorities (ECA) Air Traffic Working Group,
Mergers and Alliances in Civil Aviation-An Overview of the CurrentEnforcement Practices of the ECA ConcerningMarket Definition, Competition Assessment and Remedies, at
66 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/eca/report.pdf.
335John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't ofiustice Antitrust Div.,
Address Before the A.B.A. Section of Public Utility Communications & Transportation Law, Strategic Alliances & Converging Industries: The Government's Perspective on Corporate Combinations (Apr. 13, 1999), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2356.htm.
336 On carve-outs specifically, see Jan K_ Brueckner & Stef Proost, Carve-Outs

Under Airline Antitrust Immunity: In the Public Interest?, COMPETITION POI'Y INT'L,
GCP: THE ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2009, availableat http://www.kasperlee-aviation.com/thought-leadership/Brueckner-SEP-09-1-.pdf.
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ing sectoral rules, one should always take into account repercussions that may be produced within the wider context of
competition law. This mainly suggests that convergence of air
transport rules presupposes convergence of (certain) general
competition rules also. The challenges inherent in this process
are many. An issue arises as to whether there should be the
alignment of sectoral rules that triggers the alignment of general rules or as to whether sectoral rules should be adjusted in
accordance with aligned general rules. Arguably, the latter
course of action seems to be more appropriate. If general rules
are reformulated to accommodate the needs of converged
sectoral rules, it is certain that serious and often unpredictable
implications will be caused in other fields of law, whose regulation the parties (the European Union and the United States)
might have valid reasons not to align.
If this train of thought is correct, the question that is posed is
whether the conditions are ripe for U.S. antitrust and EU competition law to be converged. This question opens the door to a
whole new set of challenges that should be considered. First of
all, a determination should be made as to whether the need for
regulatory convergence created by multi-jurisdictional transactions is enough to justify the abolition of our legal traditions and
their replacement with a fused version thereof. Arguably, if our
legal traditions and relevant solutions devised within their context are still representative and meet our needs, then they
should be respected.
It is frequently said that the market is ahead of the regulator,
the latter always being reactive to changes happening within the
former rather than proactive. This criticism seems to suggest
that the task of the regulator is to foresee developments and
adopt the instruments that will maximize the benefits and minimize the harm thereof. The fulfillment of this mission requires
intelligence and knowledge. The challenge EU and U.S. negotiators are faced with at the moment is exactly that: to foresee
what the course of things will be if they act or refrain from acting and mold the law accordingly.
Arguably, while all that untimely regulatory intervention generates is a multiplication and magnification of already existing
problems, aligning U.S. antitrust and EU competition law just
for the sake of doing it might lead to legal inefficiency and increased legal uncertainty-the opposite outcome than desired.
Under the current regime, each jurisdiction has devised its own
legal solutions to problems inherent in the operation of the
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market. Despite occasional failures, both jurisdictions have catered to the market's needs, devising workable solutions. The
parameters to be taken into account in this process are related
to the peculiarities and particularities of each market (i.e., their
historical regulation, degree of maturity, and orientation). Regulatory convergence might deprive the system of the flexibility it
now enjoys, advancing compromise solutions unfit to address
the challenges of each market.
In addition to the danger of turning a flexible system into an
inflexible one, regulatory convergence might also turn a legally
safe system into a legally unsafe one. The plurality of legal arrangements devised under the different legal systems to deal
more or less with the same issues offers a protection to the sys-

tem as a whole, as it discourages illegality. The practical difficulties associated with the familiarization with several legal systems,
arguably, discourages attempts to evade legal obligations by
means of forum shopping or free-riding types of behavior. The
substitution of an OAA for the individual U.S.-EU member
states' markets may remove the legislative safeguards currently
in place, especially in fields as sensitive as that of safety and security, exposing the market and its participants to unforeseeable
threats. The principle of reciprocity that has historically constituted the main axis of air transport regulation, apart from aiming at equality of opportunity, 337 aims also at rendering the
country of airline designation responsible for the designated
carrier's operations. Although it is true that the new EU-U.S.
Protocol contains comprehensive provisions on the safety and
security of air transport operations, it does not allay fears as to
safety and security dumping phenomena that may appear as a
result of flagging-out opportunities. As the ultimate objective of
the Protocol is to be extended to include third countries, the
fears described are amplified." 8
Although the embarkation on a process of regulatory cooperation, aimed at alignment of rules and procedures, is in itself
indicative of the parties' respect for each other's legal system, at
the stage of implementation, tensions due to competition be37 Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 2 ("Each Party shall allow a
fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to compete in providing the international air transportation governed by this Agreement.").
338 On the dangers associated with liberalization, see ICAO, LiberalizingAir Carrier Ownership and Control, at 3.6, ICAO Doc. ATConf/S-WP/7 (Oct. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/meetings/2003/atconf5/docs/AT
Conf5_wp007_en.pdf.
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tween the EU and the U.S. legal system could not be excluded.
The contribution of the United States to antitrust law is indisputable. In fact, the world, and Europe in particular, is "historically indebted to the [United States] for having invented
antitrust. '339 EU competition law may only be greatly influenced and inspired by U.S. antitrust law. Nevertheless, EU competition law, seen within the wider context of EU law, is also a
reflection of member states' laws and legal traditions. This
means that, contrary to U.S. antitrust law, as expressed within
the context of common law, competition law is a corollary of a
mixed system, whereby common law and civil law traditions coexist. Although this last feature of EU competition law may only
facilitate the process of regulatory convergence with U.S. antitrust law, it is not in itself sufficient to prevent conflicts between
the respective legal systems.
The contingency of experiencing this type of competition in
practice could manifest itself at three levels: at the law-making
level, at the enforcement level, and at the judicial level. This is
so since conflicts as to which system should prevail may arise not
only when the law is being promulgated, but also when the law is
being interpreted. Supposing that the final agreement will preempt tensions at the law-making level, showing the direction secondary legislation should take, and that cooperation at the
enforcement level, as provided for in the ATA and Protocol, will
be equally effective, what is still unclear is the application and
interpretation of the law by the courts. Though not touched
upon by the ATA and Protocol, judicial cooperation is an acquis
of our legal civilization, as is the cooperation of the courts in the
field of competition with NCAs and similar administrative agencies. Although resort to these "remedies" is normally very effective, it could by no means interfere with the judiciary's
functional independence and relevant power to adjudicate as
deemed appropriate. The eventuality of irreconcilable interpretations and conflicting judgments becomes even clearer if actions brought by individuals before national courts on both
sides of the Atlantic are considered. The latter statement suggests that even in the hypothetical scenario that the parties
agree to the establishment of a single court empowered to hear
relevant cases, it is difficult to see how the involvement of na339 Mario Monti, European Comm'r for Competition, Comments to the
Speech Given by R. Hew Pate at the "Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context" Conference, at 1 (June 7, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
speeches/text/sp2004_005_en.pdf.
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tional courts could be avoided. As conflicting judgments may
only harm legal certainty, undermining the process of regulatory convergence and, therefore, discouraging transactions, the
raison d'tre of the Protocol itself appears questionable.
Summing up the analysis of this part, the great challenge
from a competition law perspective appears to be to avoid a regulatory failure that will induce multiple market failures. Regulatory convergence may only aim at improving the current system
by enhancing legal efficiency and eliminating legal uncertainty.
It should, therefore, only be performed if and when it is virtually
certain that these outcomes will be achieved. Although the novelty of the establishment of an OAA is almost synonymous with
the unknown, the inescapable period of transition from the old
system to the new one should not be a period of experimentation. Although it might be true that compromise solutions that
are unworkable in practice are eventually aborted by the market, it is also true that in the meanwhile, they have harmed competition. It is, therefore, the task of the regulator to ensure that
legal efficiency and legal certainty are protected and enhanced
from the very beginning of the process of regulatory convergence, and that the latter is not an experiment at the expense of
stakeholders, but only the prelude to the regulatory concert to
come.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Drawing up conclusions on issues as open as the OAA is probably an oxymoron. Keeping that in mind, what could realistically be expected for the future of the aviation industry is pretty
much dependent upon the outcome of the ongoing negotiations. The political parameters of the matter should not be underestimated. What triggered the United States to launch its
open skies policy in 1992 was the creation of a single market in
Europe and the emergence of Community Carriers.3

40

The

United States, having always pioneered the regulation of the sector of air transport and having an interest in continuing to do
so, did not hesitate to immunize conduct that under U.S. antitrust law is per se illegal in exchange for the signing of an open
skies agreement. The granting of antitrust immunity only to
those alliances or individual airlines whose governments have
concluded an open skies agreement with the United States
340 See Alan P. Dobson &Joseph A. McKinney, Sovereignty, Politics and U.S. International Airline Policy, 74J. AIR L. & CoM. 527, 536-37 (2009).
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aimed at preserving the status quo as to the ownership and control requirements and at steering the regulation of the sector
towards the direction of airline alliances. On the other side of
the Atlantic, the fait accompli of a single air transport market
opened up new horizons for European carriers that could not
be overseen either by the industry itself or by the Commission.
The suggestion of the Association of European Airlines to create
a TCAA was immediately espoused by the Commission and became the axis of the EU's future air transport policy. 41 The
TCAA was soon renamed "Open Aviation Area" to alleviate
American reaction to the "allusion" that the EU is expanding
towards the other side of the Atlantic,342 and the negotiations
commenced.
Whether a final agreement will eventually be reached is as
clear as the future. It is interesting to note that American officials call the EU-U.S. ATA already in place an "open skies plus"
agreement. 43 Whether this is suggestive of the stance the American side will adopt in the future belongs equally to the sphere
of the unknown. What is certain, except for Europe's commitment to the "normalization" of the industry, 34 4 is that the latter's
needs have changed ever since its regulation was conceived, as
has the environment within which it operates. Defining the current and future needs of the industry, taking into account its
mission, is a task difficult to perform, yet necessary to determine
the way ahead.
The current regulatory acquis, based on the O&C requirements, has manifestly succeeded in excluding altogether freeriding phenomena and in safeguarding high standards of safety
and security oversight. Where it has probably failed is in safeguarding the airlines' long-term financial viability without resort
341 See Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Jan. 3, 2000), http://www.
flightglobal.com/news/articles/freedoms-paths-62785/.
342 SeeJohn R. Byerly, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, Speech at the European Aviation Club, The U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement: Making the Most of the Second Stage, at 9 (May 13, 2008) ("I, like many
Americans, admire and salute what Europe has accomplished. We do not, however, wish to join the EU-at least not right now!"), available at http://www.europeanaviationclub.com/docs/20080513_Presentation.pdf.
343 Id. at 4.
344 See Press Release, European Comm'n IP/08/474, supra note 175, at 1
("Building on the success of the European internal aviation market, this agreement is an important first step towards the normalisation of the international
aviation industry. The ultimate objective of the European Union is to create a
transatlantic Open Aviation Area.").
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to public monies. The challenge facing EU and U.S. negotiators
is to create the regulatory environment that will allow the industry to prosper without compromising oversight standards and, in
addition, without threatening consumer welfare. The solution
devised by the parties in the form of an OAA implies a transition
from bilateralism to multilateralism.3 4 5 The prospects and challenges inherent in this process are manifold.
This article focused on competition along the lines of the parties' statement that "competition among airlines in the transatlantic market is important to promote the objectives of the
Agreement" and their confirmation "that they apply their respective competition regimes to protect and enhance overall
competition and not individual competitors."3 4' 6 The impact of
the new conditions of competition that the application of the
final agreement might bring about has been examined in relation to consumers, airlines, and finally the law itself. The analysis produced has been triggered by the striking absence of any
comprehensive study on the issues discussed. While the economics of the ATA and Protocol have attracted a great deal of
attention on both sides of the Atlantic, its legal component has
been neglected. Whether the prospect of experiencing secondgeneration open skies judgments of the European Court of Justice (following the Commission's action to initiate infringement
proceedings against almost the entirety of the Member States
regarding their bilateral agreements with Russia) will re-invigorate legal interest in air transport matters remains to be seen.
What seems imperative at this stage is to prepare the ground for
the smooth adaptation of the ATA. This may only be achieved if
the prospects and challenges thereof are foreseen so that the
prospects are adequately explored and the challenges are effectively addressed. Despite the difficulties inherent in prospective
analysis, the benefits to be reaped justify the effort.
See Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 265, at iii. The idea that the regulation of the sector should be "normalized" is not shared by the United States: "It's
simply not enough to assert that the rules for investment in airlines should be
,normalized.' There are many-not just in the United States-who believe that
airlines are anything but a normal service industry." John R. Byerly, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Affairs, Remarks to the European Aviation Club in Brussels,
Belgium (May 13, 2008).
346 Air Transport Agreement, supra note 58, art. 20.
345
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